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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Degree of M.C.M 
 
An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Market Response to  
Bank Loan Announcements in the Hong Kong Stock Market 
 
Qing Chen 
 
This study will validate several key results from previous studies of bank loan 
announcement effects by using the data from Hong Kong market following the 1997 
Asian crisis. Banks are believed to play a unique role in financial market which could 
effectively reduce the problem of information asymmetry and moral hazard. Banks 
could access borrowers’ inside information which is not available to other participants. 
Thus bank loan announcements convey valuable information to the market, and 
market response of the stock price should be positive. However, because of the 
significant reform in both financial market and information market, the valuation of 
bank loan announcement conveyed need to be reconsidered. This study investigates 
whether banks are still “unique” in the financial market or whether they are like 
middlemen between borrowers and investors. Data used in this study is collected from 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Index, and a standard event study with the market 
model is applied in the research to conduct the empirical analysis. 
The results suggest bank loan announcements are associated with significantly higher 
positive abnormal returns than non-bank loan announcements. Based on the market 
model of event study, market response is found to be significantly positive for loan 
syndication, short maturity loan and borrower’s debt ratio, and negatively related to 
 II
firm size and loan size. Bank loans with refinancing and capital expenditure and no 
specific purpose have significantly higher positive abnormal returns, and borrowers 
with property and industrial industry type have more significant positive abnormal 
returns compared to other industry type. The findings also suggest the Hong Kong 
stock market is efficient in both strong and semi-strong form for bank loan 
announcements. A strong evidence of information leakage problem is found for non-
bank loan announcements. The results are generally consistent with the existing 
literature. 
 
Key Words: bank loan announcements, abnormal returns, information asymmetry, 
syndication, loan size, loan maturity, loan purpose, firm size, industry type, debt ratio, 
market efficiency.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
One of the reasons for financial intermediaries’ existence is information asymmetries. 
According to Campbell and Kracaw (1980), the importance of financial 
intermediation is information transmission, which could reduce the information 
asymmetry and increase the market efficiency. As discussed by Diamond (1984), 
financial intermediaries could be very efficient in evaluating and monitoring 
borrowers. During the process of information transmission, the bank is believed and 
proved to be able to provide unique services in the production of information. Thus 
bank loan announcements should convey useful information to the market. 
 
According to Leland and Pyle (1977), the intrinsical value of financial intermediaries 
is their ability to solve information asymmetry and moral hazard problems. It is 
believed that informational asymmetries are particularly pronounced in financial 
markets. Borrowers typically know their wealth and risk better than lenders and 
entrepreneurs possess “inside information about their own projects for which they 
seek financing”. (p. 371) Campbell and Kracaw (1980) also stated the importance of 
financial intermediation in information production, which could reduce the 
information asymmetry and increase the market efficiency. 
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Leland and Pyle (1977) suggested that a better understanding of the borrower’s 
characteristics could benefit the lender but moral hazard prevents the direct transfer of 
information between the two participants. It is not realistic to expect the borrower to 
be perfectly honest on their reports because of the possible substantial rewards for the 
exaggerated good information. In addition, identifying “borrower’s true 
characteristics by outside parties may be costly or near impossible.” (p. 371)  
 
As discussed by Diamond (1984), financial intermediaries could be very efficient in 
evaluating and monitoring the borrowers, and it could solve the information 
asymmetry and moral hazard problem as well. During the process of information 
transmission, the bank is believed and proven to be able to provide unique services in 
the production of information and solving the moral hazard problem. Thus bank loan 
announcements should convey useful information to the market. 
 
During the information transmission process, the bank is believed and proved to be 
able to provide unique services in the production of information and resolving the 
moral hazard problem. There are a large amount of theoretical and empirical studies 
discussing the issue of whether banks are “special” (see Fama, 1985; James, 1987). 
Most of the earlier studies test the “uniqueness” of bank loans by examining the 
hypothesis that market response to bank loan announcements is different from 
publicly traded debt and non-bank loan announcements. The existing literature 
generally confirmed the result from Fama (1985) and James (1987) and suggested 
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banks are more efficient in information gathering and monitoring borrowers. 
Therefore, banks have comparative advantages in information production and 
transmission. Bank loan announcements should convey valuable information to the 
market about the borrower’s financial situation, and the market should positively 
respond to bank loan announcements (Fama, 1985; James, 1987; Lummer and 
McConnell, 1989; Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel, 1995; Wansley, Elayan and Collins, 
1992). Aintablian and Roberts (2000) reported that bank lending is different from 
non-bank lending (public debt and non-bank private placements) since banks could 
provide unique monitoring services, and bank loan announcements are associated 
with positive abnormal returns significantly higher than private placements and public 
debt.  
 
James and Smith (2000) revisited the issue and questioned the unique role of banks. 
The authors found that banks are still “special” in providing “commitment based 
financing to corporations”. On the other hand, research from Billett et al. (2006) and 
Fields et al. (2006) both questioned the “special” role of banks and found the market 
response to bank loan announcements has diminished since the findings by James 
(1987). Fields et al. (2006) suggested the diminishing market reaction to bank loan 
announcement is consistent with the dramatic change in both financial market and 
information market. 
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Apart from comparing the market response to bank loan announcements, publicly 
traded debt and non-bank loan announcements have been employed to examine the 
uniqueness of banks. Several studies have also examined how the factors, such as 
borrower characteristics, lender characteristics, and loan characteristics could 
influence the market reaction to loan announcements (Lummer and McConnell, 1989; 
Preece and Mullineaux, 1996; Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock, 1992). In addition, the 
information content of bank loan announcements is also generated under different 
banking systems compared to most of the studies in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. 
banking system (Aintablian and Roberts, 2000; Armitage, 1995a). 
 
Recent research by Boscaljon and Ho (2005) investigated the information content of 
bank loan announcements of Asian firms prior to and after the 1997 Asian crisis. 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005) particularly examined the changes in the borrower-lender 
relationship and found lender quality is the most important factor that could influence 
the information content of bank loan announcements.  
 
This research will extend the study of Boscaljon and Ho (2005) and test the effect of 
market response to bank loan announcement in the Hong Kong banking market after 
the 1997 Asian crisis. In addition, market efficiency can be tested by analysing the 
market response to new publicly-known information. Therefore, by testing the speed 
and the extent of market response to bank loan announcements, the market efficiency 
can be tested in the Hong Kong banking market.  
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1.2 Background 
The Hong Kong banking industry is developed under a free market system.  As 
reported by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Hong Kong has one of the 
highest concentrations of banking institutions in the world. Hong Kong is the third 
largest international banking centre and the second largest loan syndication centre in 
Asia.  
 
Regulation in the banking industry is considered moderate in Hong Kong. The 
banking system in Hong Kong is characterized as a 3-tier system, which includes 
three types of banking institutions, namely licensed banks, restricted licence banks, 
and deposit-taking companies. Only licensed banks and restricted licence banks can 
be called banks and deposit-taking companies are authorized to take deposits from the 
general public. Table 1.1 shows the number of reported institutions in Hong Kong as 
of April 2008. 
Table 1.1 Number of Reported Institutions in Hong Kong  
Type of Reported Financial Institutions  Number of Reported Institutions 
Licensed Banks 143 
Restricted License Banks 31 
Deposit-taking Companies 29 
Representative Offices of Foreign Banks 76 
Sources: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Hong Kong Monetary Authority; Quarterly Report  
of Employment, Vacancies & Payroll Statistics, Census & Statistics Department. April 2008. 
  
Boscaljon and Ho (2005) investigated the information content of bank loan 
announcements on Hong Kong corporations listed in the Hong Kong stock market. 
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The authors suggested the Hong Kong banking system is quite healthy with major 
local competitors, middle-market banks and small retial banks. In addition, the Hong 
Kong banking system is the one with least political influence compared to the banking 
systems in Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.  
 
The Hong Kong stock market is one of the largest emerging stock markets in the 
world. In addition, it is the second largest stock market in Asia. The first formal 
security market was established in 1891, named Association of Stockbrokers in Hong 
Kong, which changed to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) a few decades later. 
The second exchange was opened in 1921, known as the Hong Kong Stockbrokers’ 
Association. These two exchange markets merged in 1947 under the name of Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). The HKSE further merged with four other national 
exchanges at the end of the 20th century. Finally, the HKSE together with Hong Kong 
Futures Exchange Ltd., which was established in 1976, and the Hong Kong Securities 
Clearing Company Ltd., which incorporated in 1989, merged to form a unified 
company Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) in 2000. Under the 
listing rule of HKEx, after February 15th, 2002, all the listed companies need to 
submit an electronic copy of the announcement to the HKEx database.  
 
1.3 Motivations  
There are few empirical studies done to investigate the market response to bank loan 
announcement in the Asian market. As the third largest international banking centre 
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and the second largest loan syndication centre in Asia, the Hong Kong financial 
market provides an opportunity for testing the robustness of the conclusions from 
prior studies on bank loan announcements which are conducted almost exclusively in 
the U.S. market. The results of this study will identify whether banks are still 
“special” in the financial market, and whether loans from non-bank financial 
institutions are close substitutes to bank loans. Moreover, by extending the study of 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005), we could test whether the factors such as lender, borrower, 
and loan characteristics influence the market reaction after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis.  
 
We also test the market efficiency of the Hong Kong stock market by analysing the 
extent and speed of the market response to bank loan announcements. Market 
efficiency hypothesis was firstly formulated by Fama (1970). As security price is set 
by the market, an efficient market would indicate that the security price could be set 
efficiently and correctly to its fair value. On the other hand, if the market is not 
efficient, the price of the security would be overvalued or undervalued.  Since prices 
determine how resources would be distributed among market participants, efficient 
markets could allocate resources fairly and efficiently. Cheuk, Fan, and So (2005) 
suggested that market efficiency and transparency are low in most emerging markets. 
The authors found Hong Kong insiders are able to earn abnormal profits from both 
buying and selling activities. In addition, these abnormal profits depend significantly 
on firm-specific and transaction-specific factors. Small firms are found to generate the 
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largest abnormal profits. Clasessens et al. (2000) also reported that 60% of Hong 
Kong firms are group-affiliated, and 60% of the Hong Kong firms are family 
controlled. Thus our study investigates the market response to bank loan 
announcements and tests the market efficiency.  
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The literature generally suggests that banks are “special” in the financial market, and 
have comparative advantages in information gathering and providing monitoring 
services to borrowers (Fama, 1985; James, 1987; Aintablian and Roberts, 2000; James 
and Smith, 2000). For example, James (1987) suggested market response to loan 
announcements is only positive for bank loan announcement, and negative for both 
non-bank loan announcement and public debt. Aintablian and Roberts (2000) also 
confirmed bank loan announcements are associated with significant positive abnormal 
returns in the market. However, based on the study from Fields et al. (2006), 
considering the dramatic changes in both information markets and financial markets, 
the “uniqueness” role of bank needs to be reconsidered. Three research objectives and 
questions are generated based on existing literature. The research objectives include: 
 
Research Objective One examines the market efficiency of the Hong Kong Stock 
Market by investigating the market response to loan announcements. 
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Research Objective Two tests whether banks are still “special” in the financial market 
by comparing the market response to bank loan announcements and non-bank loan 
announcements. 
 
Research Objective Three examines how factors, such as loan syndication, loan 
purpose, loan maturity, debt ratio, firm size and borrower’s industry type influence 
the market response to bank loan announcements. 
 
1.5 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis consists five chapters. Chapter One provides the overall background 
information and the objectives to the research questions. Chapter Two reviews the 
relevant literature on market response to bank loan announcements. Chapter Three 
discusses the data and research methodology of this study. The empirical findings and 
results are discussed in Chapter Four. Chapter Five outlines the results implications, 
research limitations, recommendation of future studies, and conclusions for the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the studies relevant to market response to bank loan 
announcements. Section 2.1 reviews the relevant studies based on lenders’ 
characteristics, which could influence the market response to bank loan 
announcements. Section 2.2 reviews the borrowers’ characteristics, and studies on 
loan characteristics are reviewed in Section 2.3. All these three aspects are empirically 
and theoretically examined and are hypothesized to influence the market response to 
bank loan announcements.  
   
2.1 Lender Characteristics: 
2.1.1 Role of bank loans 
There are many studies examined the distinction of financial intermediaries among 
bank loans, private placements and public debt. Most of the studies identified the 
uniqueness of the role of bank loans. 
 
As with any other business relation, Leland and Pyle (1977) suggested that a bank 
relationship involves information asymmetry and moral hazard problem. The bank-
borrower relationship enables them to obtain information not available to other 
providers of funds. The Bank loan contract could also control the borrower’s risk-
taking propensity, especially in the form of collateral. 
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Fama (1985) also discussed the special role of banks. The author compared the CD 
from bank to other high-grade commercial paper and found there was no significant 
difference for the yields. Since the CD is subject to reserve requirement, the same 
yield between CD and commercial paper means the tax is not borne by the CD 
holders but by the borrowers. Therefore, Fama concluded that there must be a reason 
or something special about the bank, which makes the borrowers willing to borrow 
from the bank with a higher rate than other financial institutions.  
 
Fama (1985) developed an argument about inside and outside debts. The author 
defined bank loan and private placement as inside debts, which are the contracts that 
the debt holder could access the information that is not publicly available for the 
organization. Outside debt on the other hand is a contract where the debt holder could 
only rely on the information publicly available.  
 
Fama (1985) stated that a bank is “special” due to its comparative advantages in 
gathering information and monitoring debt contracts compared with other financial 
institutions. The author concluded there are two comparative advantages for bank 
loans. One is the relatively lower costs for monitoring firms, and the other is the 
convenience of accessing firms’ private information. The author also argued that 
small firms relied more on bank monitoring compared to large firms because of the 
lower costs. 
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James (1987) argued that reserve requirement tax could be partially offset by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the form of deposit insurance. The 
author argued that if the reserve tax of CD increases, the yield of CDs should increase 
relative to commercial paper or banker’s acceptances if the depositors of CD pay the 
tax. The result showed there is no significant difference for the yield in CD when the 
reserve requirement tax changed, and this supported Fama’s argument that the reserve 
requirement tax is borne by the bank borrowers.  
 
In order to test the uniqueness of bank loans, James (1987) provided a testable 
hypothesis to compare the stock price response among the publicly announced bank 
credit agreements, private placement and publicly placed debt. As defined in Fama 
(1985), bank loan and private placement are inside debt, and public debt is outside 
debt. Therefore, a non-negative stock price return is expected for bank loans and 
private placements, and a non-positive stock price return is expected for publicly 
placed debt. In James’ finding, there is a non-negative stock price return for bank 
loans and non-positive stock price return for publicly placed debt which supports 
Fama’s argument. However, James (1987) reported a non-negative stock price return 
for private placement. This result is similar to Mikkelson and Partch’s (1986) finding, 
which is inconsistent with Fama’s inside debt argument. Therefore, the inside 
argument could not completely explain the market reaction to bank loan 
announcement (Brumm, 1996). 
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Lummer and McConnell (1989) expanded the research from James (1987) and 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and made a distinction between new bank loans and 
loan renewals. Their result also suggested a positive stock price response to the bank 
loan announcements. 
 
Best and Zhang (1993) re-examined the role of bank loans by looking at not only 
information production from the bank’s perspective, but also from the financial 
analysts’ perspective, who is capable in evaluating and monitoring the borrowers’ 
behaviour. The analysts could gather and monitor information, and thus their services 
could be considered as a substitute for banks’ services. The authors argued that the 
function of the financial analysts did influence banks’ decisions on where to put their 
best evaluating and monitoring efforts. Banks would put more monitoring and 
investigating efforts on the borrower if the financial indicator of the borrower noisy 
and unclear. This result is consistent with the Slovin et al.’s (1992) finding. 
 
Slovin et al. (1992) discussed whether the share price responses to bank loan 
announcements differ between small firms and large firms. Since small firms have a 
relatively short history, less reputation and the problem of moral hazard, therefore 
adverse selection for small firms is more significant. Slovin et al. (1992) suggested 
banks should investigate more on small firms for monitoring and evaluating. On the 
other hand, large firms are considered to be well monitored and have good reputations, 
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therefore the banks have relatively less comparative advantage on evaluating and 
monitoring financial decisions of large firms.  
 
Based on the researches in the U.S. stock market, Aintablian and Roberts (2000) 
applied a study to the Canadian banking market and the results showed there are 
significantly higher positive abnormal returns for bank loan announcements than 
private placements and loan syndications. The result is consistent with the hypothesis 
that banks have a comparative advantage over other lenders and again confirmed the 
unique role of bank loans even under a different banking system. 
 
Andre, Mathieu, and Zhang (2001) investigated the stock market reaction to bank loan 
announcements in the Canadian market before and after the introduction of the 1988-
capital adequacy requirements. The authors found a significantly positive market 
reaction to the bank credit agreements prior to the introduction of the 1988-capital 
adequacy. Andre et al. (2001) concluded that the introduction of new policy reduced 
the information content of lines of credit significantly; however, the informativeness 
of term loans was not affected. 
 
Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2003) on the other hand tested the information content of 
the announcement of a sale of a borrower’s loan by the lending bank. Dahiya et al. 
(2003) suggested that when lenders sell a bank loan to the secondary market, they 
covey the information to the market that they are not satisfied with the borrowers’ 
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situation. Traders also believed that banks know some information which they do not 
know. This argument confirmed the uniqueness of bank loans suggested by James 
(1987), and the hypothesis from Campbell and Kracaw (1980), Diamond (1984), and 
Fama (1985), which demonstrated that banks are insiders to the borrowers’ 
information production, evaluation, and monitoring. 
 
Fields et al. (2006) revisited the study from Petersen and Rajan (2002), and suggested 
that the borrowers’ information is able to verify at a much lower cost due to the 
changes in the information market. The authors also questioned the validity of the 
information content conveyed by bank loans due to the recent changes in financial 
markets. Tracy and Carey (2000) reported an increase in complex internal credit 
rating systems used by large banks, and Schuermann (2004) reported the development 
of sophisticated internal risk management systems in the banking system due to the 
changes in the capital standards under the Base1 II agreements. Based on these 
financial reforms, Fields et al. (2006) suggested that the value of certification 
provided by bank loans could be reduced, thus lessening the market reaction to the 
loan announcements.  
 
Fields et al. (2006) examined whether the stock market’s positive response to bank 
loan announcements still exists from the period of 1980 to 2003. Their results showed 
that the reaction to bank loan announcements on average has diminished to the point 
of insignificance following the period tested by James (1987). The authors explained 
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that the results are consistent with the structural changes in financial markets, (such as 
various forms of information technology, changes in banking environment, and 
lending relationship) which should reduce the value conveyed by bank loans.  
 
A surprising result was found by Bailey, Huang, and Yang (2008) in the study of 
stock market response to bank loan announcement in the Chinese stock market from 
1999 to 2004. Under a different banking industry from previous studies, the Chinese 
banking is dominated by state-owned banks, which leads to an uncompetitive banking 
environment. In addition, because of the state-owned domination, Chinese banks are 
required to help the government to ensure social and political stability. Bailey et al. 
(2008) found that the large amount of non-performing loans in the Chinese banks is 
due to the special responsibility of the Chinese banks where poorly performing state-
owned enterprises are the heaviest borrowers. Moreover, since the Chinese stock 
market is relatively small, several limitations on the public security market and 
corporate bond are not trusted due to the poor state of law and regulation. The 
Chinese firms no matter healthy or distressed could only rely on retained earnings and 
bank loans for financing. With these situations, Bailey et al. (2008) reported that bank 
loan announcements in China no longer send positive but negative signals about the 
borrowers’ prospects.  
 
More detailed comparison among the empirical results of studies on stock price 
response to bank and non-bank loan announcements are represented in Appendix 1. 
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2.1.2 Lender monitoring 
Banks’ monitoring is very important since it is the heart of banks’ speciality 
(Aintablian, McGraw, and Roberts, 2007). Diamond (1991) first generated a model to 
test when a debt contract will be monitored by lenders, and analysed the special role 
of monitoring to alleviate moral hazard. The author explained that monitoring has two 
main functions: monitoring the borrowers’ project true risk to assure reasonable risk 
projects are taken; and providing incentives for borrowers to choose safe projects 
under bank’s monitoring. Diamond further argued that monitoring is only valuable 
when there is a moral hazard problem.  
 
Lee and Sharpe (2006) investigated the relationship between the borrowing firms’ 
abnormal returns to loan announcements and the monitoring ability of lending banks. 
The authors argued that the monitoring services of loans provided by the bank could 
sufficiently reduce the information asymmetry. There are many theoretical papers that 
support this view and showed positive abnormal returns associated with bank loan 
announcements to lender characteristics, including monitoring ability and reputation. 
However, bank’s monitoring ability was treated as homogenous in those literature 
which is actually not true. For example, Lee and Sharpe (2006) assumed if a bank 
loan is unique and bank monitoring ability is not homogenous, banks with better 
monitoring ability should add more value to their borrowers. The authors used a new 
proxy for bank’s monitoring ability which is developed from Coleman, Esho, and 
Sharpe (2004).  
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The authors argued that credit rating could reflect not only monitoring ability but also 
the banks’ risk, reputation and risk preference. Billett et al. (1995) used bank’s credit 
rating as the measurement of bank’s monitoring ability, whereas Lee and Sharpe 
(2006) used the quality and quantity of the services provided by bank employees as 
the measurement. They found a significant loan announcement returns over the 1995-
1999 periods and a strong positive relationship between monitoring ability and the 
borrowing firms’ abnormal returns. Their result is consistent with the original 
hypothesis that banks’ better monitoring ability should add more value to the 
borrowers. 
 
Aintablian et al. (2007) stated that although the proxy method for monitoring ability 
works well in Coleman et al. (2004) and Lee and Sharpe’s (2006) studies, the results 
still remain a joint test of their hypothesis and the accuracy of their proxies. Therefore, 
Aintablian et al. (2007) generated an alternative test for bank’s monitoring ability. 
The authors tested the bank’s monitoring effectiveness by focusing on an important 
subset of loans extended to environmentally risky borrowers instead of analysing a 
large sample of banks, like Coleman et al. (2004) and Lee and Sharpe (2006). During 
the loan decision making process, the bank should monitor loan applications from the 
borrowers who have potential environmental risk. The final loan announcement 
should signal to the market that the borrower passed the test and was not subject to 
high environmental risk. In other words, firms with high environmental risk may 
choose not to apply for a bank loan. In addition, following the loan, the borrower 
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would subject itself to the bank’s monitoring, and provide private environmental 
information to the bank.  
 
Aintablian et al. (2007) suggested that although the information is not public, the 
borrower could also signal to outside investors that it is in a good environmental 
condition with the monitoring from the bank. This argument confirmed that the 
bank’s lending signals the borrower’s creditworthiness to outside investors and adds 
value to the borrowers. The result is consistent with Coleman et al. (2004) and Lee 
and Sharpe’s (2006) findings, and provides further evidence on the uniqueness of 
bank loans by demonstrating the superior monitoring ability of banks to borrowers 
exposed to environmental liability. 
 
2.1.3 Lender reputation 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) modelled bank’s reputation acquisition by assuming 
that the ability to acquire reputation differed from other bond holders. This 
assumption is different to most of the previous studies, which assumed that the bank 
is special because of the unique role in monitoring borrowers. The authors argued that 
banks with greater reputation should be able to convey more information than less 
reputable banks. In addition, reputable banks are able to provide borrowers with 
financial flexibility to renegotiate the loan in the event of financial distress. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) discovered that firms are happy to pay a higher 
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interest rate on loans from reputable banks in exchange for financial flexibility in the 
case of financial distress.  
 
Billett et al. (1995) pointed out that lender reputation is an important factor which 
could influence the market response to loan announcement. Billett et al. (1995) argued 
since private and public securities are not perfect substitute for firms, lender identity 
must affect the abnormal returns from firms. The authors stated that the borrower 
could enjoy a higher quality evaluating service and more accurate monitoring from 
high credit rating lenders. The results indicated that borrowers’ abnormal returns 
increased as the lenders’ credit quality increased.  
 
Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) also concluded that lenders make decisions 
about writing a loan based on the private information from the borrower, and the 
decision is a valuable indicator of the borrower’s true risk. Credit rating lenders could 
convey valuable information in the process of accessing the private information from 
the borrower and evaluating publicly available information. In addition, better 
monitoring ability of the lender could assure the investment and spending decision 
better and further enhance the borrower’s value. This is also consistent with Fama 
(1985).  
 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005) tested the information content of bank loan announcements 
in Asian corporate firms during periods of economic uncertainty. The authors 
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concluded that the quality of the lender was an important factor in determining the 
role of bank loans and higher quality lenders played an increasing role in conveying 
information to the market. In addition, lender quality is increasingly an important role 
especially in economic uncertainty such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  
 
2.2 Borrower Characteristics 
Apart from analysing the lender’s identity, many studies also investigated the 
borrower’s characteristics to further test the difference of market response to bank 
loan announcement. 
 
2.2.1 Firm size 
Fama (1985) stated contracting costs for a bank loan is lower than outside debt like 
public securities for small organisations and individuals. Fama explained that it is 
cheaper to give one agent (bank) direct access to private information and decision 
process than providing variety of information publicly available for outside debt of 
small organization or individuals. Diamond (1989) also suggested that small firms 
receive greater benefits from bank screening services compared to larger firms. 
 
Atiase (1985) argued information production for the purpose of pricing equity and the 
precision of security prices are increasing function with firm capitalization. The 
author hypothesises that small firms, which have relatively less information available 
should have a significant change for stock price in response to public announcement. 
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Consistent with Atiase’s hypothesis, Arbel, Carvell, and Strebel (1983) found security 
analysts contributed most attention on relatively large firms.  
 
Slovin et al. (1992) tested the difference in stock price response to bank loan 
announcements between small and large firms. Slovin et al. argued if large firms are 
well monitored, the banks have no advantage in external financing process relative to 
public securities markets. Thus, share price response to bank loan announcement 
should be greater for small firms than large firms. They found a significant positive 
stock price response to both favourable loan renewals and initial credit agreements but 
no significant effect on large firms’ values for either type of bank loan agreements. 
The authors explained that larger firms face less moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems, therefore bank lending burden less information processing and monitoring. 
As a result, the market treats loans for large firms as closely allied to publicly traded 
debt securities. However, for small firms, moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems are more severe because of less history, less information produced and low 
reputation. The screening and monitoring services provided by financial 
intermediaries (especially banks) should be more valuable for small firms. Consistent 
with Fama (1985), Diamond (1991), and Atiase’s (1985) argument, Slovin et al. (1992) 
concluded monitoring services associated with private information structure of bank 
loans have a greater value for small firms than large firms. 
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Wansley et al. (1992) and Aintablian and Roberts (2000) reported that small firms 
receive greater benefit from banks’ monitoring services, which also confirmed the 
finding by Slovin et al. (1992). James and Wier (1999) reported that firms involved in 
private placements and bank loans are significantly smaller in size compared to the 
firms using public traded debt.  
 
Andre et al. (2001) also found market reaction for credit agreements was more 
significant for small firms than large firms. Fields et al. (2006) suggested that loan 
announcement abnormal returns are smaller for larger firms, which shows that there is 
more value for renewal announcements for small firms. 
 
2.2.2 Borrower’s credit rating (reputation) 
Diamond (1991) presented a theory called “life cycle” effect under the condition that 
moral hazard is sufficiently widespread. The theory suggested that firms build a 
reputation from borrowing bank loans repeatedly and use it to access the bond market 
under favourable terms. The borrower credit record used by bank monitoring could 
also be used to predict future actions when not monitored by banks. Diamond (1991) 
argued that the firm’s reputation effect is very important during the process of bank 
monitoring.  
 
Diamond (1991) found firms with high or low credit rating rely less on bank loans 
with monitoring services, and middle rated firms rely more on bank loans. The author 
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explained that high credit rating firms have low cost of capital, and these firms would 
maintain the high credit rating to retain this source of higher present value of future 
profits. High rating firms would maintain a good bank relation only as an insurance 
against possible future reputation loss. In addition, better reputation indicates that 
adverse selection is less severe, therefore, Diamond (1991) suggested that high rating 
firms, which could access securities markets better and have less financial contracting 
problems and do not need monitoring. Rajan (1992) also reported that costs and 
benefits of having an ex-post lender such as banks were relatively small for high 
rating firms, and there was no difference between bank debt and public debt for these 
firms.  
 
For middle rating firms, Diamond (1991) argued that “these firms’ ratings are too low 
to guarantee reputation effects, which could eliminate moral hazard problems but high 
enough to warrant monitoring to eliminate moral hazard.” (p. 716) The author 
reported that monitoring does not provide incentives and does not worth its costs for 
low rated firms, since low rated borrowers have less to lose if they reveal bad news. 
James and Wier (1999) and Aintablian and Roberts (2000) also reported similar 
results as Diamond (1991). 
 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Preece and Mullineaux (1996) suggested that 
firms with lower reputation could benefit more from more flexible financial services 
provided by bank loans. Rajan and Winton (1995) and Mazumdar and Yan (1997) 
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also reported that lower rated firms benefit more from bank loans in the form of 
collateral and covenants. 
 
2.2.3 Financial distress 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) used a model to test the choice between bank loan 
and publicly traded debt for firms with consideration of the possibility of debt 
renegotiation in times of financial distress. The authors found that firms in financial 
distress preferred bank loans with a higher interest rate, and firms with lower 
probability in financial distress preferred publicly traded debt, because they could 
avoid competing with high risk firms in bank loans and are able to borrow at a lower 
equilibrium interest rate. 
Bolton and Freixas (2000) suggested firms choose bank loans in the period of 
financial distress because banks are more flexible and better in evaluating and 
monitoring, and the authors found that in equilibrium, riskier firms preferred bank 
loans which is consistent with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) findings. This also 
confirmed the findings of Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) which showed that firms in 
financial distress preferred restructuring their bank debts rather than filing for 
bankruptcy. 
Besides the choice between publicly traded debt and bank loans for firms in financial 
distress, Aintablian and Robert (2000) also investigated the stock price response to 
bank loan announcements for the firms in financial distress. Aintablian and Roberts 
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(2000) categorised "restructuring" as a sub-sample, which consider firms in financial 
distress, and found firms in financial distress have a stronger stock price response to 
bank loan announcements. 
Hadlock and James (2002) also suggested that firms under high uncertainty in their 
asset values preferred bank loans. The authors concluded the stock price run-ups for 
the firms that are with high stock return volatility and undervalued, and confirmed the 
presence of information benefit of bank loans.  
2.3 Loan Characteristics 
When investigating the market reaction to bank loan announcements, one should also 
consider the impact of loan characteristics. Relevant studies on loan type (new or 
renewal), loan maturity (long or short), loan syndication (syndicated or non-
syndicated), loan purpose (general corporate purposes, refinancing, capital 
expenditure, or non-stated), loan size (large or small), covenants and collateral will be 
reviewed in this section. 
2.3.1 Loan type 
Fama (1985) developed the inside and outside debt theory which suggested bank loan 
is inside debt. Based on Fama’s bank uniqueness argument, Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) distinguished new bank loans and loan renewals, where renewals are further 
categorized as favourable renewals and unfavourable renewals. By assuming the bank 
has an information advantage, Lummer and McConnell (1989) suggested that 
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extension or renewals of existing loan agreement announcements should have larger 
share price reactions than new loan agreements. Consistent with Fama’s (1985) 
argument, bank loan review and renewal procedures are important to convey 
information to the capital market. Lummer and McConnell (1989) found significantly 
positive excess stock returns for favourable renewals, and negative for unfavourable 
renewals. The stock price response for new loans is not significantly different from 
zero. The results identified that banks do not have comparative information advantage 
for new loan agreement. Banks are able to gain information advantage in the process 
of accessing private information after the new loan agreement. Thus Lummer and 
McConnell (1989) suggested bank loan announcements could only convey 
information to the market after the establishment of an ongoing relationship, which is 
reflected in the loan renewal.  
For the unfavourable loan renewals (including loan reductions and cancellations), if 
the unfavourable is announced by the bank, the stock price response is more negative, 
and if it is announced by borrower, there is no significant stock price response. 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) explained that the actions from the banks about the 
debts could signal the information, but not the action of the borrowers. Lummer and 
McConnell’s (1989) hypothesis is confirmed by Preece and Mullineaux (1994).  
Best and Zhang (1993) also adopted Lummer and McConnell’s category on loans, 
considering financial analysts’ predictions as an alternative information production to 
banks. The authors’ result showed insignificant excess returns for new loans, and 
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significantly positive excess returns of 1.24% for revised loans. Favourably revised 
loans produce a significant positive abnormal return of 0.75% and unfavourably 
revised agreements produce a significant negative excess return of -1.82%. These 
results confirmed Lummer and McConnell’s findings that there is no information 
advantages when banks issue new loan agreements.  
 
Slovin et al. (1992) examined share price responses to bank loan announcements to 
test whether there are systematic differences between large and small firms. 
Following Lummer and McConnell (1989), Slovin et al. (1992) also divided bank 
loans into initials and renewals agreements. For small firms, the authors found 
renewal agreements had a significantly positive share price response of 2.58% which 
is consistent with Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) findings. However, Slovin, et al. 
(1992) found initial agreements also generate significantly positive excess returns of 
1.50%. For large firms, there are no significant excess returns for both loan initiations 
and renewals, which are 0.37% and 0.57% respectively. Slovin et al. (1992) reported 
that their results are consistent with Fama (1985) and Diamond’s (1984) view that 
monitoring services associated with private information impact small firms more than 
larger firms. 
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Billett et al. (1995) also followed Lummer and McConnell’s definition of new and 
renewal loans and reported positive significant abnormal returns for both new and 
renewal loans and cannot statistically distinguish them.  
Based on the classification of bank loan announcement from Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) and Best and Zhang (1993), Aintablian and Roberts (2000) further added debt 
restructuring as a sub-sample, and divided bank loans into new loans, renewals, and 
restructuring. The authors further categorized new loans into new loans with new 
banks, new loans with the same bank, and new loans with unknown banks. Renewals 
included favourable, unfavourable, and mixed, and restructurings were subdivided 
into loans with prior negative news about the borrowing firm, and with no prior 
negative news. 
The authors’ results are mostly consistent with Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) 
studies except for new loans. The result for new loans with the same bank is 
significantly positive, and insignificant for new loans with new bank and with 
unknown banks. The results for three types of renewals are not distinguishable. 
Average excess returns for favourable renewals are 1.73% and -2.48% for 
unfavourable renewals which is also insignificant. For mixed renewals, the average 
excess return is 1.78% and is statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance. 
The average abnormal return for restructuring with no prior negative news 
restructurings is 2.90%, and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. 
Restructuring with prior negative news has 3.89% for average abnormal return and is 
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statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance. These results confirmed the 
hypothesis that the market effect is stronger when the borrower is in financial distress. 
In contrast, Best and Zhang (1993) and Billett et al. (1995) revisited the issue and 
found different results compared to Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) findings. Both 
studies reported a statistically significant difference in the market reaction to initials 
and renewals in controlling the differences between the other borrowers and lenders’ 
characteristics. 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005) followed Lummer and McConnell’s classification for loans 
and found the mean excess returns between loan initials and renewals were not 
significantly different. Their results failed to confirm Fama’s (1985) renewal 
hypothesis. However, their results on the different type of renewals are consistent 
with Lummer and McConnell’s argument. 
 
2.3.2 Maturity 
James (1987) argued that bank loans are mostly short maturity compared with private 
placement or public debt, and emphasizes shorter maturities lead to more frequent 
renewals which could enhance banks’ monitoring ability. Rajan (1992) also generated 
a similar argument. James (1987) concluded the importance of maturity from three 
aspects. First, short term debt contains less risk compare to long term debt and there is 
a positive relation between the time to maturity of the debt and the elasticity of the 
 31
value of the bond by holding market value of debt constant (Merton, 1974, Ho and 
Singer, 1982). Second, according to Flannery (1986), firms’ choices of maturity could 
signal the market about the firms’ management assessment of earnings prospects, and 
firms’ that believe the assets are undervalued prefer a short term debt to reveal the 
true prospects. Third, according to Easterbrook (1984), “monitoring costs will be 
lower if firms are frequently in the market for new capital”. The results from James 
(1987) however are not consistent with his hypothesis, and the difference in average 
returns is not statistically significant.   
 
James and Wier (1999) found a more negative effect on the market reaction for longer 
maturities which confirmed James (1987) and Rajan’s (1992) arguments. More 
recently, a study from Aintablian and Roberts (2000) also reported a positive effect of 
short term maturity to the excess returns.  
 
2.3.3 Syndication 
Preece and Mullineaux (1996) investigated the impact of loan syndication on the 
market response to loan announcements. The authors formulated a contractual 
flexibility hypothesis that as the number of lenders increases (syndication increases), 
the contracting costs will increase and the value of capacity to renegotiate (contractual 
flexibility) should decline. The capacity to renegotiate is considered as a value of the 
capacity of the firms to utilize the financial situation. Therefore, Preece and 
Mullineaux (1996) argued that there should be a negative relationship between the 
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borrowing firm’s abnormal returns and the syndicate size. Their results are consistent 
with the hypothesis, which show a more positive reaction to the announcements with 
only one lender than multiple lenders.  
Rajan (1992) and Houston and James (1996) considered information monopoly in the 
single lender borrowing relation. Borrowing from a single bank lender may cause an 
information monopoly and high controlling power, which is associated with serious 
hold-out problems. They both report that multiple lenders or higher syndications 
could reduce hold-out problems and enhance the contractual flexibility, which should 
lead to a positive relationship between the borrowers’ excess returns and syndicate 
size.  
Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) argued that multiple bank lenders may 
involve significantly higher transaction costs and screening and monitoring costs. 
Debt renegotiation is also more complex when more lenders are involved. Recent 
studies from Andre et al. (2001) confirmed Preece and Mullineaux’s (1996) argument, 
and market reaction is stronger from a single bank than from multiple banks.  
2.3.4 Purpose 
James (1987) tested the excess returns for bank loan announcements by loan purposes 
and categorized the loan purposes into “repay debt”, “capital expenditure”, “general 
corporate purpose”, “repay bank loans”, and “no purpose given”. Slovin et al. (1992) 
also investigated this issue considering “future acquisitions.”  Both James (1987) and 
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Slovin et al. (1992) did not find statistically significant results for the above categories 
except for the loans with general corporate purposes. 
 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005), however, considered restructuring as an additional category 
and showed statistically positive results for capital expenditures, no specific purpose 
and repayment. In contrast, the authors did not find statistically significant results for 
general corporate purposes, which is not consistent with earlier findings. 
 
2.3.5 Loan size 
Slovin et al. (1992) tested how the relative size of the debt (ratio of the dollar value of 
the credit agreement to the market value of the common equity) of the borrower could 
affect the market response to loan announcements and the result is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) reported that firms with smaller 
sized debt rely more on private debt than public debt, and confirmed mis-match of 
debt size could convey adverse information to the market. However, Aintablian and 
Roberts (2000) reported that smaller excess returns are associated with larger loans. 
 
2.3.6 Covenants 
Rajan and Winton (1995) investigated the effectiveness of covenants by comparing 
short-term bank loans and long-term bank loans with covenants. The authors defined 
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covenants as clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain 
from various actions. Rajan and Winton (1995) argued that short-term bank loans are 
more flexible and controllable and give the lenders liquidation flexibility. Banks are 
free to act and recall the loans. However, since other stakeholders could free ride on 
the benefit of banks’ monitoring on the borrowers, banks have less incentive to 
acquire and use additional information. As a result, banks may not monitor short-term 
loans even when it is socially beneficial. 
 
Long-term debt with covenants is more preferable, if the covenants are based on the 
information that is costly to the public. Long-term debt with covenant limits the 
bank’s ability to monitor the borrowers and the banks are allowed to act only when 
the covenants are violated. However, long-term debt with covenants could increase 
the bank’s incentive to monitor by decreasing the bank’s payoff. 
 
Rajan and Winton (1995) also reported that covenants on private debt are more 
detailed and restrictive than public debt. James and Smith (2000) and Park (2000) 
both confirmed this argument and reported bank always generate more strict 
covenants. 
 
Park (2000) reported that covenants could ensure monitoring and control for firms by 
the lenders. Since covenants enable lenders to act and punish borrowers when the 
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covenant is violated, monitoring could reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard 
problem from borrowers (Smith and Warner, 1979). 
 
Gorton and Kahn (2000) on the other hand, confirmed the unique characteristics of 
bank loans in the aspect of liquidating the loan at any time in the form of tight 
covenants. 
 
2.3.7 Collateral 
Collateral is some specific assets pledged as security for a loan. It is collectively 
believed that collateralization could be very effective in solving the problems of 
asymmetric information and moral hazard, and lessen related monitoring issues. Boot, 
Thakor, and Udell (1991) reported that banks use collateral to reduce moral hazard 
problems when lenders are able to take unobservable ex post actions that affect 
project payoffs. Rajan and Winton (1995) also confirmed that collateral is important 
for solving information asymmetry, moral hazard, and monitoring issues. Rajan and 
Winton (1995) argued that collateral increases banks’ incentive to monitor since the 
information collected by banks is more useful to them than to other parties when loans 
are collateralized or contracted with covenants. 
 
James and Smith (2000) argued that banks could monitor better by securing a loan in 
the form of collateralization, which could lead to a better payoff for the borrowers. 
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This could eventually increase the incentive of monitoring for banks, which is 
consistent with Rajan and Winton’s (1995) argument. 
 
Chakraborty and Hu (2006) also suggested that collateralization could reduce 
informational asymmetry and moral hazard problems. In addition, the authors also 
reported the need for collateral to decrease as the duration of the bank-borrower 
relationship increases. Boot and Thakor (1994) reported similar results and explained 
that a longer term bank-borrower relationship enables the banks to efficiently evaluate 
the borrower over time and reduces the use of collateral. Chakraborty and Hu (2006) 
also found a negative relationship between the firm’s age and the incidence of 
collateral. The authors explained that since older firms have longer track records and 
less information problems than younger firms, they are less likely to pledge collateral.   
 
Rajan and Winton (1995) also indicated that pledged collateral conveys negative 
information to the market since offering assets as collateral could reduce the firms’ 
operational flexibility especially during financial distress. The authors argued that 
firms may not want to offer collateral in the loan contract because the market may 
take collateral as a sign the firms are in financial difficulty. 
 
James and Smith (2000) distinguished bank loans and other private placements in 
collateralization and found bank loans are more secured. The results from Carey, Post, 
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and Sharpe’s (1998) study showed that finance companies make secured loans more 
frequently and monitor the collateral more closely than banks. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the previous studies relevant to market response to bank loan 
announcements. Factors that influence the market response to bank loan 
announcements can be varied. Lender characteristics, borrower characteristics, and 
loan characteristics are all evidenced to have attributed to the abnormal returns for 
bank loan announcements. A different banking environment is also evidenced to be 
able to affect market response to bank loan announcements. Studies on the UK market 
indicate a smaller response to loan announcements, Canadian studies show a 
consistent result as the U.S. cases. However, studies on the China market reveal 
opposite results to all previous studies due to its special politically controlled banking 
industry. In conclusion, based on previous studies and theories, banks are believed to 
play unique roles in the financial markets, which could effectively reduce the problem 
of information asymmetry and moral hazard. Banks could access borrowers’ inside 
information which is not available to other participants. Thus bank loan 
announcements convey valuable information to the market, and market response to 
the stock price should be positive. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
This chapter discusses the research methodology and data used in this study. The 
research questions are discussed in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 describes the data sources 
and collection methods. Statistical tests for the research questions are described in 
Section 3.3 to 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.  
 
3.1 Research Question 
The objective of this research is to investigate the effect of market response to bank 
loan announcement in the Hong Kong banking industry. The study examines how the 
share prices react to bank loan announcements in the Hong Kong banking industry. 
 
The whole sample of loan announcements are divided into different categories, such 
as lender identity (bank loan or non-bank loan), firm size (large or small), loan 
syndication (syndicated or non-syndicated), loan purpose (general corporate purposes, 
repay debt/capital expenditure mixed, no specific purpose or other purpose), loan size 
(large or small), loan type (new or renewal), and loan maturity (less, equal, or longer 
than 3 years).  
 
Research Question One examines the market efficiency of the Hong Kong Stock 
Market by investigating the market response to loan announcements. Based on 
previous studies, two forms of tests are used to examine the market of efficiency, 
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strong-form and semi-strong form (Finnerty, 1976; Wong, 2002). Strong-form market 
efficiency tests whether inside traders earn abnormal profits from the information not 
publicly available. Semi-strong form market efficiency tests whether non-insiders 
earn abnormal profits from the information publicly available. Wong, Cheung, and 
Wu (2000) tested the market efficiency of the Hong Kong stock market and report the 
market is not efficient in the strong form for small sized firms, but is efficient in both 
strong and semi-strong form for medium and large size firms.  
 
Based on Finnerty (1976), Wong et al. (2000) and Wong (2002), if there is an 
information leakage for the announcement, which will cause an abnormal price and 
volume movement in the pre-event period, and insiders could earn abnormal profits 
from the insider trading activities, then the market is not efficient in the strong-form. 
If non-insiders could not earn abnormal profit during the event period, the market is 
efficient in the semi-strong form. 
 
Research Question Two examines whether the bank is still “special” in the financial 
market. This includes testing the uniqueness of banks in financial markets by 
comparing the abnormal returns between bank loan announcements and non-bank 
loan announcements, where non-bank loans include loans from financial institutions. 
Most previous studies suggested that banks deliver “special” monitoring services 
which are not available from non-bank intermediaries. The general results suggested 
that banks can access private information about the borrower not available to other 
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market participants which enhance banks’ screening and monitoring ability as unique. 
On the other hand, Fields et al. (2006) reported that the reaction to bank loan 
announcements on average has diminished to the point of insignificance following the 
period tested by James (1987), and the authors’ results are consistent with the 
structural changes in the financial markets, which should reduce the value conveyed 
by bank loans. 
 
Therefore, based on previous studies, the role of a bank is tested by comparing the 
abnormal returns between bank loan announcements and non-bank loan 
announcements. If the abnormal return for bank loan announcements is relatively 
more significant than the abnormal returns for non-bank loan announcements, it 
indicates that a bank plays a “unique” role in the financial market. 
 
Research Question Three examines how factors, such as loan syndication, loan 
purpose, loan maturity, debt ratio, firm size, and borrower’s industry type influence 
the market response to bank loan announcements. Previous studies suggested that 
borrower and loan characteristics can influence the market response to bank loan 
announcement (see James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Mikkelson and 
Partch, 1986; Slovin et al., 1992; and Aintablian and Roberts, 2000). In order to 
investigate the market response to bank loan announcements, further tests based on 
different borrower and loan characteristics is evaluated. This is achieved by 
comparing the abnormal returns among different sub-groups for each factor. Any sub-
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groups with significant abnormal returns will indicate the importance of the factors 
that influence the market response to bank loan announcements. 
 
3.2 Sample Data 
The sample of loan announcements is obtained from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Database. The database provides comprehensive announcements of all listed 
companies on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Besides the full text of the loan 
announcement, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Database also provides the exact 
announcement date and time. This information provides a precise assessment of the 
announcement date. Market data used in this study are collected from the Data Stream 
Database. 
 
Following the method employed by Billett et al. (1995), key words such as “credit 
agreement”, “credit extension”, “credit facility”, “credit line”, “new loan”, “bank 
loan”, and “term loan” are used to search the loan announcement for the period from 
2002 to 2007.  Initially a total of 606 announcements are obtained. According to 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005), any announcement which contains “contaminated 
information,” such as information on dividends, earnings, stock issues, debt issues, 
divestitures, bankruptcy filings, management changes, joint ventures, stock 
repurchases, and asset sales are deleted from the initial sample. Further deletion is 
applied if the borrower is no longer a listed company in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in 2008, or the announcement is announced by the parent company for the 
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indirect/direct wholly/non-wholly owned subsidiaries. Another 24 observations are 
eliminated due to the incomplete daily stock return data from DataStream, and 14 
more are deleted since the lenders are bank and non-bank with mixed loans. Therefore, 
the initial sample of 606 observations is reduced to 85 uncontaminated 
announcements, consisting 63 bank loan announcements and 17 non-bank loan 
announcements. Similar to the study by Aintablian and Roberts (2000) in the 
Canadian market and Boscaljon and Ho (2005) in the Hong Kong market, our sample 
size is much smaller than the earlier U.S. studies. This is due to the shorter time 
period, data availability, and the relatively smaller financial market capitalization. 
 
Based on Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) study, loans are classified into new loans 
and renewal loans. Renewal loans are further divided into favourable renewals and 
unfavorable renewals based on the context of each announcement. Loan agreements 
are classified as new loans if it indicates it is new or does not indicate it is renewal. 
Due to the short period of the study, only 11 renewal loan announcements are 
obtained, including 1 bank loan favourable renewal, 1 bank loan unfavourable 
renewal, and 9 favourable renewals for loans from non-bank financial institutions. 
The small number of renewal loan announcements observed in this research limited 
the further comparison between new loan and loan renewal. Moreover, further tests 
are generated based on the favourable loan announcements. 
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Various proxies have been used for firm size in pervious researches. For example, 
market capitalization is the most commonly used proxy for firm size, which is 
obtained by multiplying the share price by the number of outstanding shares of the 
firm (see Fama, 1985; Slovin et al., 1992; Armitage, 1995a; Boscaljon and Ho, 2005). 
Brumm (1996), however, adopted total assets as a proxy for firm size. The author 
explained that the market value of common stock is based on the discounted value of 
expected dividends throughout the life of the firm. Therefore, market expectations of 
the firms’ future growth are used in the proxies of market capitalization. Since share 
price is already included as an independent variable in the research, and to avoid 
redundancy of independent variables caused by the market expectation factor, Brumm 
(1996) obtained total asset as the proxy for firm size. For this study, both proxies 
(market capitalization and total assets) for firm size are obtained. 
 
Following Slovin et al.’s (1992) study, firm size is classified by using the median 
market value/total assets of all listed firms in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in that 
relevant year. The total sample is then divided into small and large groups. Firms are 
defined as small if the market value/total assets is less than the median market 
value/total assets or large if greater than the median value. Under this classification, 
48 firms are grouped as large firms and 14 are grouped as small firms by market 
capitalization; 50 firms are grouped as large firms and 12 are grouped as small firms 
by total assets.      
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Based on the information content of the announcement, 43 loans are classified as 
syndicated loans and 19 are considered as non-syndicated. However, the number of 
lenders for syndicated loans is not observable. 
 
Following James (1987) and Aintablian and Roberts (2000), loan size is adjusted into 
relative loan size by using the dollar value of loan size divided by total assets of the 
firm. Loan amount valued as foreign currency are converted into Hong Kong dollars 
at the exchange rate of that specific day of signing the loan contract. The exchange 
rate is obtained from the historical exchange rates in OANDA forex trading and 
currency information database, which is one of the world’s largest historical high 
frequency, filtered currency databases. 
 
Following the small sample and large number of mixed purpose loans, loan purposes 
are classified into four groups: “general purpose”, “refinancing and capital 
expenditure mixed purpose”, “no purpose stated”, and “other purpose”. Under this 
classification, 8 announcements are defined as general purposes, 24 as refinancing 
and capital expenditure mixed purpose loan announcements, 20 as no specific purpose, 
and 10 of the announcements are for other purposes.  
 
Based on Bhushan’s (1989) study, a firm’s industry type is an important firm 
characteristics and Brumm (1996) reported that industry type of borrowing firm could 
influence the market response to bank loan announcements. Industry types of sample 
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firms were collected from the PREFACE database. Firms’ industry types that were 
not included in the PREFACE database are further obtained from the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange website. Industry types include finance company, utilities, property, 
consolidated enterprises, industrial, hotel, and others. Industry groups are further 
classified into property, consolidated enterprise, industrial, and others. 
 
Following the methodology of Ongena and Roscovan (2009), the debt ratio is 
obtained by using total debt divided by total assets of the borrower. The data for total 
debt and total assets are collected from the DataStream Database. 
 
Loan maturity data is collected from the content of each announcement. Most of the 
bank loans are short term loans between 1 to 5 years. Based on the data collected, the 
total sample is grouped into 3 categories: less than 3 years, 3 years, and longer than 3 
years. 
 
Daily return data and daily share prices are obtained from DataStream Database, as 
well as the information for total assets, market value, and total debt of the borrowing 
firms. Data for daily market return is obtained from the DataStream Database and the 
proxy for the market from the DataStream value-weighted market portfolio.  
 
Brown and Warner (1985) suggested that an equally-weighed market index could 
detect the abnormal performance better than the value-weighted market index. 
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Krueger and Johnson (1991) tested the abnormal performance for market efficiency 
by using both equally-weighed and value-weighted market index. The results were 
similar and the authors suggested the difference for the results between equally-
weighed and value-weighted market index are generally robust to market surrogate 
selection. 
 
3.3 Event Study 
This study employs the standard event study methodology used by Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986), James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), and Preece and 
Mullineaux (1996). Based on James (1987), Armitage (1995a), and Boscaljon and 
Ho’s (2005) studies, our estimation period is 120 days starting from 130 days prior to 
the announcement date and ending at 10 days before the announcement date (as 
shown by period T0, T1 in Figure 3.3.1 below).  The two-day event window is 
employed from –1 day to the announcement date (T1,T). The market model of event 
study methodology is used to test the abnormal returns from the bank loan 
announcements.  
 
 
Estimation 
Window 
Event 
Window
Post-Event 
Window 
T0= -130 T1= -10 T2= +10 T3T=0
Figure 3.3.1: Event Study Timeline for loan announcement 
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If there is a favourable market response to the loan announcement, a positive 
abnormal return is expected for the borrower’s stock. Abnormal return is defined as 
the difference between the actual return during the event window and the expected 
normal return (the return expected if the event did not take place) estimated over the 
estimation period. The expected normal return is generated by the market model of 
event study. 
 
3.3.1 Estimation period 
Peterson (1989) used daily returns to estimate the event study which varies from 100 
to 300 days. The longer estimation period would lead to a more precise estimation for 
α and β. However, α and β will also become “out of date” due to the longer estimation 
period. Armitage (1995b) suggested an estimation period of around 100 days is 
usually appropriate.  
 
Brown and Warner (1985) compared the event study using monthly stock returns and 
daily stock returns. The authors concluded that using daily stock return data reinforces 
the results of using monthly stock return data.  
 
Based on the Brown and Warner (1985), James (1987), Armitage (1995a), and 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005), the daily return data is calculated for 151 trading days in 
this study. The estimation period is from -130 trading days to -10 trading days prior to 
the announcement date (T=0). 
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3.3.2 Event period 
The event period in this study is 21 days, which includes 10 trading days (-10) prior to 
the announcement date (t=0) to detect any information leakage and 10 trading days 
(+10) after the announcement to test the price adjustment.  
 
Most of the U.S. studies tested the period from -1 to 0, 0 or from 0 to +1 as the event 
window. Mikkelson and Partch (1986), James (1987), and Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) used the day the announcement appears in the Wall Street Journal as the event 
date. They assumed the announcements are made during trading hours of the previous 
day and reported with one-day lag. Based on this methodology, the event window 
they chose is days (-1,0). Following the previous studies, our event window is defined 
as (-1,0) to detect the market response to bank loan announcement. 
 
On the other hand, there is a possibility of information leakage before the 
announcement is made. For example, James (1987) and Armitage (1995a) both 
considered the information leakage problem in the process of market response to bank 
loan announcements in the U.S. market and use a 41-trading-days event period in 
their research. Armitage (1995a) tested this problem by calculating cumulative 
average standardized abnormal returns for the period of –11 to -2. However, their 
results are not significant, which indicate there is little or no leakage of loan 
information.  
 
 49
Wong et al. (2000) investigated the abnormal returns associated with insider trading 
from 1991 to 1993 in the Hong Kong Stock market. The authors reported that the 
abnormal profits associated with insider trading are concentrated on small firms, and 
insiders for medium-sized and large firms do not earn abnormal profits. The results 
indicated that the Hong Kong Stock market of medium and large size firms is efficient 
in both strong and semi-strong form of market efficiency, and the market for small 
firms is only efficient in semi-strong form of market efficiency. 
 
Wong (2002) also found the insider trading problem in the Hong Kong stock market 
by testing the abnormal price and volume performances associated with corporate 
news announcements from 1994 to 2002. The author reported little inside trading 
activities for Hong Kong and the U.S. stocks in the Hong Kong stock market, but a 
significant inside trading activities in China-affiliated firms listed in the Hong Kong 
stock market. 
 
By testing the abnormal returns during the pre-announcement period, this study 
reveals further evidence on the inside trading activities in the Hong Kong stock 
market. However, since the data for the historical trading price and volume is not 
available, the market efficiency could only be tested in the semi-strong form.  
 
Following James (1987) and Armitage (1995a)’s information leakage theory and 
methodology, according to Research Question One, the cumulative standardized 
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abnormal returns (CSARs) are calculated for days –10 to –2 to detect any information 
leakage. 
 
3.3.3 Market model 
The event study method has been frequently employed to measure the effects of 
economic events (such as mergers and acquisitions, earning announcements, and issue 
of new debts) on the value of firms (MacKinlay, 1997). The market model is one of 
the frequent models used in the event study. It specifies a linear ex-ante relation 
between the return of the firm and the return of the market portfolio. Based on Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965), the market model could eliminate market-wide elements of 
price changes. Brown and Warner (1985) also stated that “Methodology based on 
OLS market model and general parametric tests are well-specified under variety of 
conditions”. (p. 25) Therefore, the market model is used in this research to test the 
abnormal returns from the bank loan announcements.  
 
The model is given as follows: 
jt mtj jtjR R     (1) 
Where Rjt is the rate of return on security j on day t, αj and βj are market model 
parameters for firm j estimated by OLS regression, Rmt is the rate of return on the 
value-weighted market index on day t and εjt is the random error term for security j on 
day t. Based on Fama (1968), Beja (1972), and Fama (1973), the estimation assumes 
the joint distribution of the returns is stationary throughout time. 
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The abnormal return for firm j on day t is calculated as follows: 
)(jt jt m tjjA R R R      (2) 
Where ARjt is the abnormal return on security j on day t.  
 
The significance test of abnormal returns is based on standardized abnormal returns 
(SARjt). Patell (1976) applied the standardized abnormal returns in his study.  This is 
calculated by dividing the event period residuals by the standard deviation of the 
estimation period residuals corrected by the prediction error. Armitage (1995b) 
explained the prediction error could arise in two ways. First, the error could arise from 
the difference between the true regression line and the estimated regression line. 
Second, the errors could also arise from the difference between the true returns and 
the expected returns. The author suggested that standardized tests could be an 
accurate estimator of the standard deviation of abnormal returns. The condition of the 
standardized tests is that there are no cross-sectional correlations between the 
observations’ returns.  
 
Standardized abnormal return is calculated as follows: 
j t
j t
j t
A RS A R S
   (3) 
Where Sjt is the standard error of the abnormal returns based on the prediction error 
adjustment. 
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Sjt is calculated as follows: 
2
j jtjt V CS     (4) 
Where 2jV  is residual variance of firm j’s market model regression, Cjt is the increase 
in variance due to prediction outside the estimation period.  
 
Cjt is calculated as follows: 
2
2
1
( )11
( )
mt m
jt T
mi m
i
C
T
R R
R R

        
 (5) 
Rm is the mean market return over the estimation period, Rmt is the market return 
during the event period, Rmi is the market return during the estimation period, and T is 
the number of days in the estimation period for firm j. T could be different among 
different firms. 
 
Abnormal returns are aggregated to obtain the general market response to bank loan 
announcements. Abnormal returns are summed (cumulative abnormal returns) for 
multiple event windows to test the market efficiency, and cross securities by different 
groups for day (-1,0) to test the factors that could influence the market response to 
loan announcements. During the aggregation process, it is assumed that there is no 
clustering or overlapping in the event windows of the included securities. The absence 
of clustering or overlapping shows that the abnormal returns or the cumulative 
abnormal returns will be independent across securities. 
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The average standardized abnormal return for the portfolio is calculated as follows: 
1
1
1
j t
j
A S A R S A R
N 
    (6) 
Where N is the number of loan announcements. 
 
ASAR for firm j on t1=-1 and t2=0 are summed to generate the two-day cumulative 
average standardized abnormal returns (CASAR) and is defined as follows: 
2
1 2
1
( , )
t
t t t
t
C A SA R A SA R   (7) 
By assuming that individual abnormal returns are cross-sectionally independent and 
normally distributed, t-statistic could be tested as follows: 
tT N CASAR   (8) 
 
3.4 Test of Hypotheses 
Under the null hypothesis of no announcement effect, the average standardized two-
day abnormal return (ASAR-1,0) of N loan announcements is distributed N (0,1/ N ). 
Ho : CASAR t = 0 
 
The sign of the CASARt will indicate whether the abnormal return is positive or 
negative. The full sample is classified into sub-groups by lender identity, syndication, 
loan purpose, borrower’s industry type, firm size, loan size, loan maturity, and debt 
ratio to further investigate the factors that could influence the market response to bank 
loan announcements.  
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To answer Research Question One, CASARt for the full sample will be tested. To 
answer Research Question Two, CASARt will be tested for bank loan and non-bank 
loan announcements respectively, using the calculated t-statistics. Similarly, CASARt 
will be calculated and compared with the t-value for each subgroup (loan syndication, 
loan purpose, borrower’s industry type, borrower’s firm size, loan size, loan maturity, 
and debt ratio) based on the sample of bank loan announcements. 
 
3.5 Comprehensive Tests 
Based on James (1987), Slovin et al. (1992), and Boscaljo and Ho (2005), 
multivariate regression analysis for the bank loan announcements is employed with 
standardized abnormal returns (SAR) as the dependent variable. The multivariate 
analysis tests the relative explanatory power of each variable that may influence the 
market response to bank loan announcements. Potential interdependencies between 
the major variables could also be tested. In addition, the small sample sizes problem 
can be avoided by employing dummy variables. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j r n o
e i p j
SAR Syn RLoanSize LoanPur LoanPur LoanPur
LoanM DebtR FirmS Industry Industry Industry
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      
     
      
(9) 
 Where SARj is the standardized abnormal return of firm j, Syn is the loan syndication, 
RloanSize is the relative loan size which is the loan size divided by the market value 
of the firm, LoanPur is loan purpose, LoanM is the loan maturity, DebtR is the debt 
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ratio of the borrower, FirmS is the firm size of the borrower, Industry is the 
borrower’s industry type, and εj is the random error term. 
 
Relative loan size, debt ratio, and loan maturity are continuous variables and lender 
identity, syndication, and firm size are dummy variables. Loan purpose and industry 
type are categorical variables which are defined as N-1 dummy variables (N = number 
of the category). LoanPurr is refinancing and capital expenditure loan purpose, 
LoanPurn is no specific purpose and LoanPuro is other purpose. Industryo is other 
types of industry, Industryi is industrial and Industryp is property. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter first discusses the research questions followed by review of relevant 
literatures. Section two describes the data source that will be used in this study. The 
empirical equations and statistical test method for the research questions are presented 
in section three. This includes a discussion of the multiple regression test method.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND RESULTS DISCUSSION 
This chapter reports the results and analyses of the study. Section 4.1 presents the 
results of the sample selection. Section 4.2 describes the characteristics of the sample 
firms including descriptive statistics. Following this, Section 4.3 discusses the market 
response to loan announcements, and the results of the research questions are 
discussed in Section 4.4 to 4.9.  Section 4.10 summarizes the main findings of the 
study.  
 
4.1 Sample Selection Results 
A total of 606 loan announcements are initially obtained from the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange Database from 2002 to 2007. After the elimination for the contaminated 
and redundant observations, a total of 80 loan announcements are obtained, consisting 
of 63 bank loan announcements and 17 non-bank loan announcements. Table 4.1 
presents the distribution of announcements by lender identity from 2002 to 2007. As 
shown in Table 4.1, the number of bank loans announced is significantly larger than 
the number of non-bank loans announced. The number of bank loan announcements 
has increased significantly since 2005. The number of non-bank loan announcements 
remained stable from 2002 to 2005 and increased dramatically from 2006. 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for bank and non-bank loan 
announcements. Panel A contains the descriptive statistics for the full sample and 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of bank loan announcement 
disaggregated by lender identity, firm size and loan syndication.  
Table 4.1:  
Number of Loan announcement from 2002 to 2007 in Hong Kong Stock Market 
  Bank loan announcement Non-bank loan announcement 
2002 2 0 
2003 11 2 
2004 7 2 
2005 15 2 
2006 15 6 
2007 12 5 
Total 62 17 
 
In Panel A, the standard deviation for total assets is extremely high, which indicates 
the firm size varies widely among the full sample. The standard deviations for loan 
size and total debt category are also very high, 2.968 and 6.188 respectively. However, 
the standard deviation for the relative values for both loan size and total debt are quite 
low. This would indicate larger size loans and higher total debt are mostly with firms 
with larger total assets.  
 
In Panel B, the numbers show that bank loans have relatively larger size than non-
bank loans and borrowers for non-bank loans are more likely to have a higher debt 
ratio. The mean debt ratio for the borrowers with bank loans is 0.26 with a standard 
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deviation of 0.142 compared to the mean debt ratio for the borrowers with non- bank 
loans of 0.398 and a standard deviation of 0.246. 
 
According to firm size, the relatively higher standard deviation indicates that firm size 
varies more widely for non-bank loan borrowers. The mean firm size for bank loan 
borrowers and non-bank loan borrowers are 8.44 billion and 10.87 billion respectively.  
 
The results for firm size category in Panel C show that larger firms are involved in 
larger loans on average. The mean loan size for larger firms is 1.38 billion and 0.15 
billion for small firms. The numbers also indicate the larger firms have higher debt 
(mean value of 2.543 for larger firms and 0.191 for smaller firms). However, when we 
look at the relative loan size and debt ratio, firms in different size groups are quite 
similar. 
  
For the loan syndication category in Panel D, it is surprising to find that non-
syndicated bank loans are large loans. This could be explained by the relatively higher 
standard deviation and wide range of the loan size among non-syndicated bank loans. 
In addition, syndicated bank loans have relatively higher total debt than non-
syndicated bank loans. Firm size for syndicated bank loans is also relatively larger 
than for non-syndicated bank loans. By examining the debt ratio, the number is still 
higher for syndicated bank loans, whereas, relative loan size is quite similar for both 
types of loans.  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics for Loan Size, Firm Total Assets, Firm Total Debt, Firm Debt Ratio and Relative Loan Size for 
the Full Sample and Samples Disaggregated according to Lender identity, Firm Size and Loan Syndication 
              
Panel A: Descriptive Data for the Full Sample          
 N Mean S.d. Range        
Loan Size (HK$ Billion) 80 1.0399 2.9683 0.0045 ~ 25.4745        
Total debt (HK$ Billion) 80 2.4405 6.1884 0 ~ 50.0632        
Total Asset (HK$ Billion) 80 8.9593 18.7607 0.0081 ~ 139.8190        
Debt ratio 80 0.2891 0.1774 0 ~ 0.9603        
relative loan size 80 0.1777 0.1321 0.0024 ~ 0.5541        
              
Panel B: Non-Bank Loan vs Bank Loan           
   Non-Bank Loan        Bank Loan    
 N Mean S.d. Range  N Mean S.d. Range 
Loan Size (HK$ Billion) 17 0.6608 1.3667 0.0045 ~ 5.4270  63 1.1422 3.2689 0.0094 ~ 25.4745
Total debt (HK$ Billion) 17 3.7220 12.0918 0.0040 ~ 50.0632  63 2.0947 3.2393 0.000 ~ 12.6450
Total asset (HK$ Billion) 17 10.8746 33.8461 0.0081 ~ 139.8190  63 8.4424 12.3111 0.2283 ~ 50.4393
Debt Ratio 17 0.3984 0.2464 0.0372 ~ 0.9603  63 0.2596 0.1423 0.000 ~ 0.5905 
Relative loan size 17 0.2015 0.1461 0.0388 ~ 0.5541   63 0.1712 0.1285 0.0024 ~ 0.5513 
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Panel C: Large Firms vs Small Firms 
 Large Firms         Small Firms    
 N Mean S.d. Range  N Mean S.d. Range 
Loan Size (HK$ Billion) 51 1.3839 3.5993 0.0094 ~ 25.4745  12 0.1539 0.0773 0.06 ~ 0.3 
Total debt (HK$ Billion) 51 2.543 3.454 0.000 ~ 12.645  12 0.191 0.146 0.039 ~ 0.472 
Total Asset (HK$ Billion) 51 10.280 13.032 0.667 ~ 50.439  12 0.632 0.243 0.228 ~ 1.020 
Debt ratio 51 0.255 0.143 0.000 ~ 0.590  12 0.277 0.145 0.085 ~ 0.474 
Relative loan size 51 0.152 0.118 0.002 ~ 0.510   12 0.264 0.135 0.077 ~ 0.551 
              
Panel D: Syndicated Bank Loan vs Non-Syndicated Bank Loan        
 Syndicated Bank Loan      Non-Syndicated Bank Loan    
 N Mean S.d. Range  N Mean S.d. Range 
Loan Size (HK$ Billion) 43 0.972 1.127 0.006 ~ 4.113  20 1.531 5.643 0.009 ~ 25.475 
Total debt (HK$ Billion) 43 2.421 3.344 0.039 ~ 12.645  20 1.394 2.961 0.000 ~ 12.304 
Total Asset (HK$ Billion) 43 8.999 12.096 0.389 ~ 42.473  20 7.245 12.998 0.228 ~ 50.439 
Debt ratio 43 0.297 0.139 0.015 ~ 0.590  20 0.180 0.117 0.000 ~ 0.426 
Relative loan size 43 0.181 0.117 0.004 ~ 0.510   20 0.156 0.150 0.002 ~ 0.551 
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4.3 Market Response to Bank Loan Announcement 
The SARs are calculated each day during the event period across the 79 firms. Table 
4.3 shows the AARs, ASARs, CASARs results and the relevant t-values. Relevant 
graphs refer to table 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 are presented in Appendix 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Based on the daily ASAR in Table 4.3.1, ASAR is statistically insignificant during the 
pre-announcement period for the full sample. However, ASAR is significantly 
positive on day –1, and CASAR is significantly positive on days –1 to 0. 
 
Results shown in Table 4.3.2 describes the ASARs, CASARs and the relevant t-
values for bank loan announcements. Similar to the results for the full sample, ASARs 
are not statistically significant during the pre-announcement period, but ASAR is 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance on day –1 with a t-value of 1.50, 
 
The results for the sample group of non-bank loan announcements are somewhat 
different. As shown in Table 4.3.3, day -8 shows significant positive ASARs during 
the pre-announcement period, which indicates a possibility of information leakage 
(Armitage, 1995a). Further tests on this problem will be discussed in the following 
section.  
 
Similar to the result for the full sample and bank loan announcements, a significant 
positive ASAR is shown on day –1 for non-bank loan announcements. These results 
indicate the market reacts to loan announcements favourably, and the response takes 
place on day –1. A strong evidence for information leakage for non-bank loan 
announcement is found due to the significant ASARs occurred during the pre-
announcement period. 
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Table 4.3.1  
AARs, ASARs, CASARs, and the T-Stats for Full Sample 
From Day -10 to Day+10 
Event Day T AAR (%) ASAR T TEST(ASAR) CASAR T TEST (CASAR)
T = -10 0.27 0.0023 0.0207 0.0023 0.0207 
T = -9 -0.21 -0.0303 -0.2694 -0.0280 -0.2487 
T = -8 -0.15 0.1439 1.2792 0.1159 1.0304 
T = -7 0.34 0.0041 0.0361 0.1200 1.0665 
T = -6 0.14 -0.0227 -0.2020 0.0973 0.8645 
T = -5 0.03 0.0293 0.2607 0.1266 1.1251 
T = -4 0.04 0.0299 0.2662 0.1565 1.3913* 
T = -3 -0.63 -0.0852 -0.7573 0.0713 0.6340 
T = -2 0.53 0.0280 0.2487 0.0993 0.8827 
T = -1 0.63 0.2415 2.1464** 0.3408 3.0292*** 
T = 0 0.53 -0.0016 -0.0144 0.3392 3.0148*** 
T = 1 -0.52 -0.1300 -1.1558 0.2092 1.8590* 
T = 2 -0.13 -0.0677 -0.6015 0.1415 1.2575 
T = 3 -0.25 -0.0492 -0.4373 0.0923 0.8202 
T = 4 0.07 0.1044 0.9283 0.1967 1.7485** 
T = 5 -0.59 -0.0652 -0.5798 0.1315 1.1687 
T = 6 0.14 0.0184 0.1640 0.1499 1.3327* 
T = 7 -0.32 -0.1906 -1.6942** -0.0407 -0.3615 
T = 8 0.61 0.1309 1.1637 0.0903 0.8022 
T = 9 -0.35 -0.0363 -0.3228 0.0539 0.4795 
T = 10 0.10 -0.0115 -0.1022 0.0425 0.3773 
 
AAR: Abnormal Average Return 
ASAR: Average Standardized Abnormal Return 
CASAR: Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level  
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Table 4.3.2  
AARs, ASARs, CASARs, and the T-Stats for Bank Loan Announcement 
From Day -10 to Day+10 
Event Day T AAR (%) ASAR CASAR T TEST (ASAR) 
T = -10 -0.08 -0.0609 -0.0609 -0.4793 
T = -9 -0.28 -0.0261 -0.0870 -0.2057 
T = -8 -0.41 0.0905 0.0035 0.7127 
T = -7 0.19 -0.0833 -0.0798 -0.6559 
T = -6 0.28 0.0072 -0.0726 0.0567 
T = -5 0.14 0.0995 0.0269 0.7831 
T = -4 0.07 0.0503 0.0772 0.3961 
T = -3 -0.82 -0.1188 -0.0417 -0.9358 
T = -2 0.24 0.0014 -0.0403 0.0109 
T = -1 0.40 0.1911 0.1508 1.5047* 
T = 0 0.58 0.0684 0.2192 0.5384 
T = 1 -0.26 -0.0827 0.1365 -0.6510 
T = 2 -0.08 -0.0854 0.0511 -0.6724 
T = 3 -0.71 -0.1758 -0.1247 -1.3844* 
T = 4 -0.27 0.0756 -0.0491 0.5956 
T = 5 -0.80 -0.1012 -0.1503 -0.7968 
T = 6 -0.15 -0.0421 -0.1924 -0.3318 
T = 7 -0.27 -0.2496 -0.4420 -1.9656** 
T = 8 0.67 0.1479 -0.2941 1.1645 
T = 9 -0.58 -0.0813 -0.3754 -0.6398 
T = 10 0.05 -0.0187 -0.3941 -0.1475 
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Table 4.3.3  
AARs, ASARs, CASARs, and the T-Stats for Non-Bank Loan Announcement 
From Day -10 to Day+10 
Event Day T AAR (%) ASAR CASAR T TEST(ASAR) 
T = -10 1.53 0.2328 0.2328 0.9598 
T = -9 0.05 -0.0456 0.1872 -0.1878 
T = -8 0.82 0.3387 0.5259 1.3964* 
T = -7 0.89 0.3226 0.8485 1.3303 
T = -6 -0.38 -0.1319 0.7166 -0.5438 
T = -5 -0.39 -0.2264 0.4902 -0.9335 
T = -4 -0.05 -0.0443 0.4459 -0.1826 
T = -3 0.07 0.0375 0.4834 0.1546 
T = -2 1.58 0.1250 0.6084 0.5153 
T = -1 1.49 0.4253 1.0337 1.7536** 
T = 0 0.37 -0.2569 0.7768 -1.0592 
T = 1 -1.49 -0.3028 0.4741 -1.2484 
T = 2 -0.30 -0.0030 0.4710 -0.0125 
T = 3 1.41 0.4126 0.8836 1.7012* 
T = 4 1.33 0.2095 1.0931 0.8636 
T = 5 0.17 0.0659 1.1590 0.2719 
T = 6 1.22 0.2394 1.3984 0.9871 
T = 7 -0.49 0.0247 1.4231 0.1016 
T = 8 0.38 0.0691 1.4921 0.2847 
T = 9 0.47 0.1276 1.6198 0.5261 
T = 10 0.28 0.0149 1.6347 0.0616 
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4.4 Market Efficiency: Hong Kong Stock Market 
 Table 4.3.1 shows no significant abnormal return appeared during the pre-
announcement for the full sample. This indicates that there is no evidence of an 
information leakage problem. Abnormal return occurs on the day –1 of 6.3% with a t-
value of 2.14, and statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. 
 
As in Table 4.3.2, the sample of bank loan announcements shows similar results to the 
full sample. There is no significant excess return during the pre-announcement period, 
which suggests no evidence of an information leakage problem for bank loan 
announcements. Abnormal return occurs on day -1 of 4% with a t-value of 1.5, and 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance.  
 
In terms of non-bank loan announcements, significant abnormal returns are found 
during the pre-announcement period. This indicates a strong evidence that an 
information leakage problem exists for non-bank loan announcements.  
 
Table 4.4 reports the CASAR for the following event period days: -1 to 0 and -10 to –
2 for the full sample, bank loan announcements and non-bank loan announcements. 
According to Table 4.4 Panel A, CASAR for the period –10 to –2 is not significant for 
the full sample and bank loan announcements. However, non-bank loan 
announcements with a value of 2.51 is significant at the 0.05 level of significance. 
 
For the period –1 to 0, both full sample and bank loan announcements have significant 
CASARs. The result for non-bank loan announcement is not statistically significant as 
shown in Table 4.4 Panel B. 
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Table 4.4 
Panel A: CAARs, CASARs and the T-Stats for Event Days -10 to Day -2 
 CAAR (-10,-2) (%) CASAR(-10,-2) t Statistics 
Full Sample 0.36 0.0993 0.88 
Bank Loan -0.68 -0.0403 -0.32 
Non-Bank Loan 4.14 0.6084 2.51** 
    
Panel B: CAARs, CASARs and the T-Stats for Event Days -1 to Day 0   
 CAAR (-1, 0) (%) CASAR(-1,0) t Statistics 
Full Sample 1.16 0.2399 2.14** 
Bank Loan 0.97 0.2595 2.04** 
Non-Bank Loan 0.18 0.1684 0.69 
 
CAAR: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
CASAR: Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Two forms of method are available for testing the efficiency of the market, strong 
form and semi-strong form. The strong form efficiency tests whether insiders could 
earn abnormal profits by using non-publicly available information and the semi-strong 
form efficiency test whether non-insiders could earn abnormal profit from the 
information publicly available (Wong, 2002). Based on Wong (2002) and Wong et al. 
(2000) studies and since the data for stock trade volume is not available in our study, 
we apply only the semi-strong efficiency test in our research. 
 
As shown in Table 4.4 Panel A, for the share price movement before the 
announcement date, the excess abnormal returns for the period (-10,-2) is significant 
for non-bank loan announcements. Armitage (1995a) discussed the information 
leakage problem when testing the market response to bank loan announcements in the 
U.K. market. The author suggested if there is any information leakage, abnormal 
return should appear in the pre-announcement period. Based on Armitage’s (1995a) 
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study, the significant abnormal returns in the period of (-10,-2) suggested a strong 
information leakage problem about the non-bank loan announcement. In terms of 
bank loan announcements, the CASAR is not statistically significant in the pre-
announcement period, which does not indicate any information leakage problem.  
 
Wong et al. (2000) also reported significant insider trading activities for the firms in 
Hong Kong stock market. The authors reported an average cumulative abnormal 
return of 1.85% for the period –5 to –1. In addition, Wong (2002) examined the 
efficiency of the Hong Kong stock market and reported strong insider-trading 
activities among the listed firms. The author reported that the price increases 
significantly around day –10 and reach almost 10% at the announcement date. 
 
In general, there is a significant abnormal return for the period (–1, 0), and weak 
evidence of abnormal price movement for the period +1 to +10 for bank loan 
announcement. Moreover, the results did not indicate any information leakage 
problem for bank loan announcements. Therefore, we can conclude the market is 
efficient in both strong form and semi-strong form for bank loan announcements. In 
addition, there is also strong evidence of insider activities prior to the event date for 
non-bank loan announcements. 
 
The strong form market efficiency cannot be tested because of lack of data. 
Furthermore, insiders who earn abnormal profits cannot be examined either. Thus, 
regulation on insider trading in the Hong Kong stock market for non-bank loans is 
necessary and could reduce the “dishonest” trading based on the non-public 
information. 
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4.5 Bank Loan V.S. Non-Bank Loan 
Table 4.5 shows the results of the stock price response to loan announcements for the 
full sample. The average excess return for all bank loans is 0.9% and is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level of significance. In addition, based on the 62 observations 
(one unfavourable bank loan announcement is excluded), 50% of the excess returns 
are positive. The average excess return for non-bank loan announcements is 1.86%, 
which is not statistically significant.  
 
Consistent with Fama’s (1985) inside debt argument, average excess return for bank 
loans is significantly positive. Fama (1985) suggested that a bank has a comparative 
advantage in gathering information and monitoring debt contracts compared with 
other financial institutions. Thus bank loan announcements should convey valuable 
information to the market and the market should react favourably to bank loan 
announcements.  
 
Based on Fama’s insider debt argument, both bank loans and non-bank loans are 
inside debt, and the market should react to both types of loans significantly positive. 
Inconsistent with Fama’s inside debt argument, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and 
James (1987) reported insignificant excess return to non-bank loan announcements. 
The authors suggested that the inside debt argument could not completely explain the 
market reaction to loan announcements. Consistent with Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
and James (1987), average excess return for non-bank loans is found insignificant in 
this study. The results further confirm the unique role of banks in financial markets.  
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In general, the Hong Kong stock market reacts positively to bank loan announcements, 
but the excess return for non-bank loan announcements is insignificant, which 
confirms the “special” role of banks in the Hong Kong financial market.  
 
4.6 Loan Characteristics 
Panel B in Table 4.5 shows the results for two-day CASAR and AR for the sample 
divided by loan characteristics based on the sample of favourable bank loan 
announcements. 
 
 
4.6.1 Loan syndication 
Preece and Mullineaux (1996) investigated the impact of loan syndication on the 
market response to loan announcements and reported a negative relationship between 
the loan syndication and the market abnormal returns. Preece and Mullineaux (1996) 
explained that as the number of lenders increases, syndication contracting cost will 
increase since the value of capacity to renegotiate declines, and therefore, a non-
syndicated loan is associated with positive excess returns. 
 
Rajan (1992) and Houston and James (1996) on the other hand reported a positive 
relationship between loan syndication and abnormal return. They both explained that 
single lender may cause information monopoly which may lead to hold-out problems. 
Multiple lenders could reduce hold-out problems and enhance contractual flexibility. 
Recent research from Le (2007) examined the impact of syndicated loan 
announcements on the share price of the borrowing firms in the U.S. market, and 
reported that syndicated loans elicit positive market reaction. 
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Our result is consistent with the finding from Rajan (1992), Houston and James 
(1996), and Le (2007). A significant positive abnormal return of 1.24% is found for 
syndicated loan with a t-value of 2.47 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level of 
significance. The abnormal return for non-syndicated bank loan is 0.37% and is not 
statistically significant. The results indicate that Hong Kong stock market reacts 
positively to syndicated bank loans.  
 
4.6.2 Loan size 
Slovin et al. (1992) examined the loan size effect to the market response to bank loan 
announcements, but their result is insignificant. Aintablian and Roberts (2000) also 
tested the loan size factor and found a negative relationship between the loan size and 
the abnormal returns. 
 
Our research result is consistent with Aintablian and Roberts’s (2000) findings. The 
two-day excess return for large size loan is 1.4% with a t-value of 0.699, but not 
statistically significant. For small size loan, the abnormal return is 0.7% with a t-value 
of 1.99, and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. 
 
Based on Cukur, Eryigit, and Duran’s (2008) study, the negative relationship in our 
result might be because of the risk consideration. As the loan size increases, there is a 
higher risk involved and the market reacts negatively. Therefore, consistent with the 
findings of Aintablian and Roberts (2000) and Cukur et al. (2008), our result indicates 
that small size loan is associated with more significant abnormal returns, and there is a 
negative relationship between loan size and market excess returns to bank loan 
announcements. 
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Table 4.5 
Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return (CASAR) 
for Event Day -1 to 0 
Categories N CAAR (%) CASAR T-Statistics
Percent 
positive 
AR 
Percent 
positive 
SAR 
Panel A: Full Sample disaggregated by Lender Characteristics 
 Bank Loan 62 0.90 0.259 2.043** 50.00% 50.81%
 Non-Bank Loan 17 1.86 0.168 0.694 64.17% 59.50%
Panel B: Sample of Bank Loans disaggregated by loan Characteristics 
By Syndication       
 Syndicated 43 1.24 0.377 2.473*** 55.81% 51.10%
 Non-Syndicated 19 0.37 -0.007 -0.029 36.84% 50.00%
By Loan Size (Relative Loan Size)       
 Large 20 1.40 0.156 0.699 55.00% 55.00%
 Small 42 0.70 0.309 1.999** 47.62% 47.62%
By Loan Purpose       
 General 8 0.30 0.065 0.185 37.50% 50.00%
 Refinancing and Capital Expenditure 24 1.55 0.291 1.426* 50.00% 50.00%
 No Specific Purpose 20 0.70 0.433 1.936** 55.00% 55.00%
 Others 10 -1.00 -0.008 -0.026 40.00% 50.00%
By Loan Maturity       
 < 3 year 4 2.47 1.032 2.063* 75.00% 62.50%
 3 year 18 -0.10 0.063 0.268 50.00% 47.22%
 > 3 year 32 1.30 0.198 1.122 43.75% 47.54%
Panel C: Sample of Bank Loans disaggregated by Borrower Characteristics 
By Industry       
 Property 7 2.10 0.789 2.086** 42.85% 57.14%
 Consolidated Enterprises 14 -0.90 -0.133 -0.497 50.00% 46.43%
 Industrial 33 1.50 0.320 1.836** 48.49% 51.52%
 Others 8 1.20 0.235 0.665 62.50% 50.00%
By Firm Size (Total Asset)       
 Large 50 0.40 0.183 1.291 46.00% 50.00%
 Small 12 3.40 0.580 2.009** 66.67% 54.20%
By Firm Size (MV)       
 Large 48 0.39 0.204 1.414* 45.83% 48.96%
 Small 14 2.99 0.449 1.681* 64.29% 57.14%
By Debt Ratio       
 High 28 2.22 0.595 3.148*** 60.71% 57.14%
 Low 34 -0.05 -0.017 -0.098 41.18% 45.59%
CAAR: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
CASAR: Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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4.6.3 Loan purpose 
Based on James (1987) and Slovin et al.’s (1992) study, the loan purpose of the 
borrower is tested as a factor that may influence the market response to bank loan 
announcements. Based on James (1987), Slovin et al., (1992), and Boscaljon and Ho’s 
(2005) studies and data availability, loan purpose in our study is divided into general 
purpose, capital expenditure and refinancing, no specific purpose, and others.  
 
Consistent with Boscaljon and Ho’s (2005) findings, the abnormal return for loans 
with general purpose is not statistically significant. The two-day excess return is 0.3% 
and t-value is 0.185. The abnormal returns for refinancing and capital expenditure 
group and no specific purpose are 1.55% and 0.7% with a t-value of 1.43 and 1.94, 
and statistically significant at the 0.1 level and the 0.05 level of significance 
respectively. Excess returns for other purpose category is not statistically significant. 
 
4.6.4 Loan maturity 
James (1987) concluded that short-term debt is associated with less risk compared to 
longer term debt, and expect greater excess return for short-term loans during the 
announcement period. However, James’s result for loan maturity hypothesis is 
insignificant. 
 
James and Wier (1999) found a negative effect on the market reaction for loan 
maturity. Aintablian and Roberts (2000) also reported a positive effect of shorter 
maturity loan to the excess returns. Our result is consistent with the loan maturity 
argument from James (1987), where bank loans with maturity of less than 3 years 
have a positive abnormal return of 2.47% with a t-value of 2.06, and statistically 
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significant at the 0.1 level. The abnormal returns of loans with maturity equal and 
longer than 3 years are not statistically significant, which failed to confirm the 
negative effect on market react to longer maturity loans (James and Wier, 1999; and 
Aintablian and Roberts, 2000). 
 
4.7 Borrower Characteristics 
Panel C in Table 4.5 shows the CASAR and AR results for the period –1 to 0 with 
relevant t-values for the sample divided by borrower characteristics based on 
favourable bank loan announcements. 
 
4.7.1 Industry 
Ongena, Smith and Michalsen (1999) suggested industry type could be a factor to 
influence market response to bank loan announcement. Boscaljon and Ho (2005) 
grouped industry types as computer, conglomerate, real estate, construction, and 
chemistry. The authors reported a significant positive abnormal return for computer 
industry and a significant negative abnormal return for construction industry. 
 
Consistent with Cheuk et al. (2005), following the classification of PACAP database, 
the types of industry in our study is divided into property, consolidated enterprises, 
industrial, and others. 
 
Our result shows significant positive abnormal returns in property and industrial 
groups. The mean excess returns are 2.1% and 1.5% with t-value of 2.086 and 1.836 
respectively and are statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. The 
results for consolidated enterprises and others are not statistically significant. 
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4.7.2 Firm size 
With regard to firm size, the two-day excess returns for small and large firms are 
2.99% and 0.39% with t-values of 1.29 and 2.01 respectively. The result for small 
firms is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance and only significant at 
the 0.1 level for large firms (see Table 4.5 Panel C). 
 
Our results are consistent with previous studies. For example, Slovin et al. (1992) 
concluded that monitoring services associated with the private information structure 
of bank loans have a greater value for small firms than large firms. Wansley et al. 
(1992) and Aintablian and Roberts (1999) confirmed that small firms receive more 
benefit from bank monitoring services. Slovin et al. (1992) explained that small firms 
have relatively more severe moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Moreover, 
compared to large firm, small firms have relatively shorter history, less information 
generated, and poor reputation. Therefore, the authors concluded the screening and 
monitoring services offered by a bank is more valuable for small firms.  Recent 
research by Andre et al. (2001) also found market response to loan announcements is 
more significant for small firms than large firms.  
 
Similar test is evaluated under the total asset classification for firm size. Our results 
are consistent with previous tests (Slovin, Johnson and Glascock, 1992; Wansley, 
Elayan and Collins, 1992; Aintablian and Roberts, 2000). The two-day excess returns 
for small firms are 3.4% with a t-value of 2.009 and statistically significant at the 0.05 
level of significance. For large firms, the excess returns are 0.4% with a t-value of 
1.291 but not statistically significant. 
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4.7.3 Debt ratio 
In terms of debt ratio, the two-day excess returns for high debt ratio are 2.22% with a 
t-value of 3.15 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance. The 
abnormal return for low debt ratio is –0.05% with a t-value of –0.098 and not 
statistically significant. 
 
No previous study has examined the market response to bank loan announcements 
from the borrower’s debt ratio perspective. However, Bhandari (1988) tested the 
relationship between DE ratio and stock expected returns by combining DE ratio with 
the CAPM, and reported a coefficient of 0.13% for DE ratio that is significantly 
positive. Bhandari (1988) explained that as the DE ratio increases, the common equity 
of the firm also increases, including the risk involved, therefore, a positive 
relationship is expected between DE ratio and stock expected returns.  
 
Debt ratio measures the leverage of the firm, and the level of leverage is often a 
measurement for the risk level of the firm. Moreover, the high debt ratio indicates the 
total debt relative to a firm’s assets is high, which means a bigger burden for the firm. 
In addition, interest payment for the debt would take a bigger amount in firm’s cash 
flows. The firm would also carry more risk for the increase of interest rate. The high 
debt ratio then could indicate that the firm could take more advantages from the extra 
risk taken. 
 
On the other hand, a low debt ratio indicates a low degree of leverage. Firm have 
relatively smaller burden for paying back the debt. However, low debt ratio also 
indicates that firm has an opportunity to use leverage as a means of responsibly 
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growing the business that it is not taking advantage of. Therefore, low expected 
excess return is expected with low debt ratio. 
 
Consistent with the explanation from Bhandari (1988), the two-day excess returns for 
the higher debt ratio borrower is significantly positive, but for the lower debt ratio 
borrower is statistically insignificant, which confirms the significant positive 
relationship between debt ratio and the excess returns to bank loan announcements. 
Based on the results, the Hong Kong stock market reacts positively to borrowers with 
higher debt ratio for the bank loan announcement.  
 
4.8 Insider Trading 
As discussed in Section 4.5, there is a significant information leakage and inside 
trading activity before the announcement date for non-bank loan announcements. The 
excess return for the pre-announcement period (-10,-2) is 4.14% with a t-value of 2.51, 
and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance (see Table 4.4 Panel A). 
The excess return from day -10 to day -2 is not statistically significant for bank loan 
announcements. Therefore, there is no evidence of information leakage problems for 
bank loan announcements, but strong information leakage and inside trading activity 
for non-bank loan announcements during the pre-announcement period (see Table 4.4 
Panel A). 
 
Wong et al. (2000) and Cheuk et al. (2005) tested the insider trading in the Hong 
Kong stock market and reported that abnormal price performance associated with 
insider trading is concentrated on smaller firms. Our result is consistent with Wong et 
al. (2000) and Cheuk et al.’s (2005) findings. Following Wong et al. (2000) and 
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Cheuk et al.’s (2005) study, our research sample is divided into two equal parts 
according to firm size, which is measured by market capitalization and the insider 
trading period is defined from days -10 to -2. Our result showed the average excess 
return in period -10 to -2 for small firms is 7.1% with a t-value of 2.66, and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. For large firms, the abnormal 
return is 0.8% with a t-value of 0.83, and is not statistically significant (see Table 4.6).  
 
Since the separation of management and ownership is rare for small firms, managers 
or owners are more informed about the business situation of their own firms, and 
insider trading which involves the director of small firms is most likely to be 
profitable (Cheuk et al., 2005). 
 
Wong (2002) investigated the insider trading problem in the Hong Kong stock market 
and concluded very little unusual price and volume behaviour for both Hong Kong 
and the U.S. stocks. However, Wong’s result showed a strong evidence of insider-
trading activities among the Red-Chips1 and H-Share2 stocks of the China-affiliated 
firms listed in the Hong Kong stock market. Our result also confirms the finding from 
Wong (2002).  
 
The average excess return from day -10 to -2 is 0.3% for China-affiliated firms with a 
t-value of 2.80, and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. For 
non-China-affiliated firms, the average excess return is 2.3% with a t-value of 1.31 
and is not statistically significant (see Table 4.6 Panel B).  
                                                 
1 “Red-Chips are stock of Hong Kong registered and listed firms in which Chinese interests control more than 35% 
of issued stock.” (Wong, 2002; p.9) 
 
2 “H-Shares are stocks of Chinese central government-owned firms that remained incorporated in China but 
obtained permission from the government to list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.” (Wong, 2002; p.10) 
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Table 4.6  
CAARs, CASARs, and the T-Stats for Event Days -10 to Day -2 
For Non-Bank Loan Announcement disaggregated by Firm Size and Firm’s Location 
Categories 
  
Number of 
Observation 
CAAR     
(%) CASAR T-Statistics 
Percent 
positive 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Panel A: Sample disaggregated by firm size    
 small firm 9 7.1 0.88 2.66** 77.78% 
 large firm 8 0.8 0.29 0.83 50.00% 
Panel B: Sample disaggregated by firm's location    
 non-China-affiliated 13 2.3 0.36 1.31 61.54% 
  China-affiliated 4 0.3 1.40 2.80** 75.00% 
 
CAAR: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
CASAR: Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
Based on Wong (2002), severe poor disclosure, low transparency, and relation-based 
system problems existed for Chinese firms. Therefore, although these firms are listed 
in the Hong Kong stock market, since the parents of both Red-Chips and H-shares are 
regulated from Beijing, the Hong Kong Securities, and Futures Commission could not 
sufficiently regulate these firms, and the insider trading problem is more severe for 
China-affiliated firms listed in the Hong Kong stock market. 
  
4.9 Regression Analysis    
We estimate a multivariate regression for the 62 bank loan announcements with a 
two-day announcement period (-1, 0), using standardized excess return as the 
dependent variable. The regression analysis could validate the results from the earlier 
tests (see Table 4.5) in two ways. First, the problem of small sample size in the earlier 
tests could be avoided by employing dummy variables. Second, the joint test on all 
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major variables studied addresses the problem of potential interdependencies between 
the loan characteristic variables. 
 
The independent variables are:  
D1, D2, D3, and D4, are dummy variables representing (1) if the loan is a syndicated loan 
(2) the if loan is for refinancing purposes, (3) if the loan has no specific purpose, and 
(4) if the loan is for other purposes, or zero otherwise.  
 
D5, D6, D7, and D8 are dummy variables presenting (1) if the borrower is property 
industry type, (2) if the borrower is industrial industry type, (3) if the borrower is 
other industry type, and (4) if the borrower is large sized firm, or zero otherwise 
 
X1, X2, and X3 are continuous variables. X1 indicates the relative loan size defined as 
loan size divided by the market value of the firm, X2 is loan maturity, and X3 is the 
debt ratio defined as total debt divided by total asset of the firm.  
 
The regression results are presented in Table 4.7. The first four dummy variables (D1, 
D2, D3, and D4) test whether the loan syndication and loan purpose could affect excess 
returns. The coefficient for loans with refinancing purpose and no specific purpose is 
1.1967 and 1.2784, with t-values of 1.933 and 2.061, respectively and both are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. Our result shows that excess 
returns are significantly higher when the loans are for refinancing purposes and no 
specific purpose. This supports the finding of Boscaljon and Ho (2005) and the results 
tested in the earlier tests (see Section 4.7.3). 
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D5, D6, and D7 show test how the borrower’s industry type could influence the market 
response to bank loan announcement. According to Table 4.7, the coefficients for 
property industry and industrial industry are 1.609 and 0.931, with t-values of 2.84 
and 2.32 respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance. The results indicate that the excess returns are significantly positive and 
higher for borrowers with “property” and “industrial” industries. After eliminating the 
problem of small sample size by using dummy variables, the regression results further 
support the finding in the previous tests, where only property industry and industrial 
industry have statistically significant abnormal returns (see Table 4.5).   
 
Moreover, the significance of D8 suggests that small firm size is associated with more 
excess returns. The coefficient for D8 is -0.7322 with a t-value of -1.37, and 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance. The significant negative 
coefficient further confirms the negative relationship between the borrower’s firm size 
and excess returns. This enhances the argument by Slovin et al. (1992), Wansley et al. 
(1992), and Aintablian and Roberts (2000). The authors suggested that small firms 
have relatively higher moral hazard and adverse selection problems, lower reputation 
and less information produced, therefore, small firms receive more benefit from bank 
screening and monitoring services than large firms.  
 
The variable X1 tests the relationship between loan size and the market response to 
bank loan announcements. The coefficient of X1 is -0.0006, with a t-value of -1.364, 
and statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance. The significant negative 
coefficient of loan size suggests that a smaller size loan is associated with a larger 
excess return. As discussed in Section 4.7.2, a larger size loan is associated with lower 
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excess returns which could be explained by the risk consideration.  Risk increases as 
the size of the loan increases, and the market respond to larger size loans negatively 
(Cukur et al., 2008). Our regression result is consistent with the results in earlier tests 
(see Section 4.7.2), where small size loan has a significant positive abnormal return. 
In addition, our regression result further confirms the finding of Aintablian and 
Roberts (2000) that larger loans are associated with smaller excess returns.  
 
The variable X3 is debt ratio calculated using total debt divided by total assets. The 
coefficient is 3.366 with a t-value of 2.568, statistically significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance. The significant positive coefficient indicates that higher debt ratio is 
associated with a higher excess return. Consistent with earlier tests in Section 4.8.3, 
the abnormal return for borrowers with a high debt ratio is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level of significance and not statistically significant for borrowers with a low 
debt ratio. The coefficient further confirms the positive relationship between debt 
ratio and excess returns. It also confirms the finding of Bhandari (1988) that DE ratio 
is significant and positively related to expected stock returns.  
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Table 4.7  
Results of Regression of Standardized Abnormal Returns on various 
Standardized Dummy Variables for a Sample of 63 Bank Loans 
Sample: 1 62         
Included observations: 54     
       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
       
Intercept -1.9762 0.9371 -2.1089 0.041 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1311     
D1 0.1211 0.4257 0.2845 0.7774 
(1 if syndicated loan,0 otherwise     
D2 1.1967 0.6191 1.933** 0.06 
(1 if refinancing purpose, 0 otherwise)    
D3 1.2784 0.6202 2.061** 0.0455 
(1 if no specific purpose, 0 otherwise)    
D4 1.0092 1.3546 0.7450 0.4604 
(1 if other purpose, 0 otherwise)     
D5 1.6090 0.5676 2.84** 0.007 
(1 if property industry type, 0 otherwise)    
D6 0.9310 0.4009 2.32** 0.0251 
(1 if industrial industry type, 0 otherwise)    
D7 0.3497 0.5650 0.6189 0.5393 
(1 if other industry type, 0 otherwise)    
D8 -0.7322 0.5348 -1.37* 0.1782 
(Yearly market capitalization)     
X1 -0.0006 0.0004 -1.364* 0.1799 
(loan size divided by market capitalization)    
X2 0.0349 0.1336 0.2616 0.7949 
Loan Maturity      
X3 3.366 1.310686 2.568** 0.0139 
(total debt divided by total asset) 
 
R2: 0.093 
F-statistic: 4.54               
Durbin-Watson statistics: 1.46       
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the results of our study. From our results, we can conclude that 
the market reacts favourably to loan announcements, and the Hong Kong stock market 
is both strong and semi-strong form efficient for bank loan announcements. In 
addition, strong evidence of an information leakage problem is found for non-bank 
loan announcements. 
 
We divide the full sample into bank loan announcements and non-bank loan 
announcements. Our result shows the excess return for bank loan announcements is 
more significant than non-bank loan announcement, which enhances bank’s special 
role in screening and monitoring borrowers by accessing private information not 
available to other market participants.  
 
For loan characteristics, the market reacts significantly positive to syndicated bank 
loans compared to non-syndicated bank loans. This confirms the finding of Rajan 
(1992) and Houston and James (1996), which suggests syndicated loans could reduce 
hold-out problems caused by information monopoly and improve the contractual 
flexibility. In addition, our result is also consistent with Aintablian and Roberts’s 
(2000) findings where a larger size loan is associated with lower excess returns. 
Moreover, bank loans with refinancing and capital expenditure purposes and no 
specific purpose is found to be associated with significant positive abnormal returns. 
This is consistent with the results from Boscaljon and Ho (2005). 
 
In terms of borrower characteristics, industry type of property and industrial are 
significant and positively associated with abnormal returns. Consistent with Slovin et 
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al. (1992), Wansley et al. (1992), and Aintablian and Robert’s (2000) studies, small 
firms are found to be associated with more positive excess returns. Moreover, the 
market reacts positively to bank loan announcements when the borrower has a high 
debt ratio. 
 
Further detailed tests are evaluated for non-bank loan announcements on the 
information leakage problem during the pre-announcement period. Following the 
studies from Wong et al. (2000) and Wong (2002), the full sample is divided by 
borrower size and borrower’s location (China-affiliated or non-China affiliated). Our 
results are consistent with Wong et al. (2000) and Wong (2002), where the 
information leakage problem is more severe for small firms and China-affiliated firms. 
 
Multi-regression is used in order to reduce the problem of small sample size and 
addresses the problem of potential interdependencies between the loan and borrower 
characteristic variables. The regression analysis confirms the results from the earlier 
tests shown in Table 4.5. Based on results of the regression (see Table 4.7), the 
significant variables include loan purpose, industry type, loan size, firm size, and debt 
ratio. This suggests that the market response to bank loan announcements could be 
partially explained by these variables in the Hong Kong stock market.  
 
In general, compared to previous studies conducted in the U.S., Canadian, and the 
U.K. market, the overall results of our study confirm previous findings under a 
different banking system and environment in the Hong Kong market. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the findings of study on the market response to bank loan 
announcement in Hong Kong stock market. Section 5.1 describes an overview of the 
study. Section 5.2 discusses the results and relevant implications of the study. 
Conclusion of this study is reported in Section 5.3 and limitation of the research is 
discussed in Section 5.4. The final section, Section 5.5 states some recommendations 
for future research. 
 
5.1 Overview of This Study 
The role of bank loans, non-bank loans, and public debt are discussed in many studies 
in the U.S. financial market. For example, Fama (1985) developed an inside and 
outside debt argument suggesting that bank loans are “special” compared to other 
types of corporate finance, since banks have comparative advantages in information 
gathering and monitoring services. James (1987) extended Fama’s study and 
generated a testable implication to compare share price movement among bank loan 
announcements, non-bank loan announcements, and public debt announcements. The 
author confirmed Fama’s (1985) argument that a bank is “special”.  
 
Based on Fama’s (1985) and James’s (1987) studies, further investigation on the 
information content of bank loan announcements are based on disaggregating the 
bank loans into sub-groups based on borrower characteristics, lender characteristics, 
and loan characteristics. Results from previous studies (see Lummer and McConnell, 
1989; Rajan, 1992; Slovin et al., 1992; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; James and 
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Smith, 2000) showed that borrower, lender, and loan characteristics influence the 
market response to bank loan announcements.  
 
In addition, a different banking environment is also evidenced to be a factor to 
influence the market response to bank loan announcements.  For example, Armitage’s 
(1995a) study on the U.K. stock market showed less responsive to loan announcement 
compared to the U.S. studies. Aintablian and Roberts’s (2000) study on the Canadian 
capital market showed similar results to the U.S. cases, and studies on China’s market 
reported opposite results to previous studies due to its special politically controlled 
banking industry.  
 
Based on previous theories generated by Fama (1985) and the studies from Mikkelson 
and Partch (1986), James (1987), and Lummer and McConnell (1989), banks are 
believed to play unique roles in the financial markets, which could effectively reduce 
the information asymmetry problem and moral hazard. Banks could access borrowers’ 
inside information which is not available to other participants, and provide effective 
monitoring and evaluating services. Thus bank loan announcements convey valuable 
information to the market, and market response to the bank loan announcements 
favourably. 
 
This study examines how the share prices react to bank loan announcements in the 
Hong Kong banking industry. Three research objectives are generated for this study. 
Research Objective One is to examine the market efficiency of the Hong Kong stock 
market by investigating the market response to loan announcements. Research 
Objective Two examines whether a bank is still “special” in the financial market. This 
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includes testing the uniqueness of banks in financial markets by comparing the 
abnormal returns between bank loan announcements and non-bank loan 
announcements, where non-bank loans include loans from other financial institutions. 
Research Objective Three examines how factors, such as loan syndication, loan 
purpose, loan maturity, debt ratio, firm size, and borrower’s industry type influence 
the market response to bank loan announcements. 
 
A sample of firms receiving loans was collected by searching the HKEx Database for 
the period 2002 through 2007. Loans are classified into bank loans and non-bank 
loans. Further classification is generated based on loan syndication, loan purpose, loan 
size, loan maturity, borrower firm size, and borrower debt ratio. Market model of 
standard event study is applied in this study to detect the abnormal returns to the loan 
announcements. Abnormal returns are further standardized and aggregated across 
firms. A t-test is generated based on the standardized abnormal returns. In order to 
reduce the problem of small sample size and potential interdependencies between the 
loan and borrower characteristics, further multivariate regression analysis for bank 
loan announcements is employed with standardized abnormal returns as the dependent 
variable, and each loan and borrower characteristic as an independent variable. 
Relative explanatory power of each loan and borrower characteristic is tested in the 
multivariate regression analysis. 
 
5.2 Results and Implications 
5.2.1 Results for research objective one and implications 
Our results on market response to loan announcements show no evidence of an 
information leakage problem for bank loan announcements, and no continuous 
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abnormal return during the post-event period. In addition, the abnormal return only 
occurred during the two-day event window. Therefore, our results suggest that the 
Hong Kong stock market is efficient in both strong and semi-strong form for bank 
loan announcements. 
 
On the other hand, we find strong evidence of an information leakage problem for 
non-bank loan announcements in the Hong Kong stock market. The abnormal returns 
occur as early as eight days before the announcement date. Since the data for stock 
trade price and volume is not available during the pre-announcement period, based on 
the Wong et al.’s (2000) study, the strong form of market efficiency is not testable in 
our research. In addition, the semi-strong form of market efficiency is not testable for 
non-bank loan announcements since there is no significant abnormal return during the 
two-day event window. 
 
Based on Wong et al.’s (2000) and Wong’s (2002) studies, further tests are performed 
on the information leakage problem on non-bank financial institutions. The full 
sample of non-bank loan announcements is divided by borrowers’ firm size and 
borrowers’ firm location (China-affiliated firms and non-China-affiliated firms). Our 
results indicate the information leakage problem is more severe for small firms and 
China-affiliated firms, which is consistent with Wong et al. (2000), Wong (2002), and 
Cheuk et al.’s (2005) findings.  
 
Two main laws on insider trading are available in Hong Kong - Securities (Disclosure 
of Interest) Ordinance (SDIO), and the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance. Both 
have introduced on September 1st, 1991. The purpose of this legislation is to ensure 
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that no one is allowed to earn a profit from trading firms’ securities by using 
undisclosed private information about the firm. Although insider trading is legally 
constrained by regulation, the regulatory system seems imperfect. Insider trading 
activities are still rampant, and researches from Wong et al. (2000), Wong (2002) and 
Cheuk et al. (2005) conducted tests on the borrower side for the information leakage. 
However, due to the strong evidence of the information leakage problem in non-bank 
loan announcements, we suppose that there is also a possibility that the information 
was leaked from the lender’s (non-bank financial institution) side. Since non-bank 
financial institutions are less regulated than banks, more regulation on non-bank 
financial institutions is necessary.  
 
5.2.2 Results for research objective two and implications 
We test the special role of banks in the Hong Kong financial market by comparing the 
difference between the market response to bank loan announcements and non-bank 
loan announcements. Our results suggest that the Hong Kong market response to bank 
loan announcements is statistically positively significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance, whereas, the abnormal return for non-bank loan announcements is not 
statistically significant. The result further confirms the unique role of banks in the 
Hong Kong financial market subject to small sample size. 
 
In addition, the results also indicate that a strong information leakage problem exists 
for non-bank loan announcements, and the abnormal return to non-bank loan 
announcements appeared during the pre-announcement period rather than during the 
two-day event window period. The information leakage problem might bias the test 
results of bank’s uniqueness. Based on the non-bank loan announcements result 
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during the pre-announcement period, the market reacts to non-bank loan 
announcements positively significant at the 0.05 level of significance. Assuming the 
problem of information leakage for non-bank loan announcements is eliminated, the 
market response to non-bank loan announcement would only appear during the two-
day event window, but not during the pre-announcement period. If the abnormal 
return during the two-day event window is statistically significant with the elimination 
of the information leakage problem, the difference in market response to bank and 
non-bank loan announcements needs to be reconsidered. If the market response to 
bank loan announcements is still more significant than non-bank loan announcements, 
the “special” role of banks in the Hong Kong financial market is confirmed. However, 
if the market response to non-bank loan announcements is more significant than bank 
loan announcements, banks are no longer “special” in the Hong Kong financial 
market.  
 
5.2.3 Results for research objective three and implications 
Research Objective Three examine factors, such as loan syndication, loan purpose, 
loan maturity, debt ratio, firm size, and borrower’s industry type that influence the 
market response to bank loan announcements. The results indicate that market 
response to bank loan announcements are positively related to loan syndication, debt 
ratio, and negatively related to firm size and loan size. These results are consistent 
with the findings from Rajan (1992), James and Wier (1999), Aintablian and Roberts 
(2000), and Slovin et al. (1992). The multiple regression analysis confirms that the 
market response to bank loan announcements in the Hong Kong stock market could 
be partially explained by loan purpose, loan maturity, debt ratio, firm size, and 
borrower’s industry type. Consistent with James (1987), Bhandari (1988), Aintablian 
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and Roberts (2000), Slovin et al. (1992), and Ongena et al.’s (1999) findings, loan 
purpose, loan maturity, borrower’s debt ratio, firm size, and borrower’s industry type 
could be important factors influencing market response to bank loan announcements. 
 
However, based on the low R2 value from our multi-regression model, it seems that 
there are other variables which could also influence market response to bank loan 
announcements. For example, loan type (new loan or renewal loan), lender reputation, 
and borrower reputation are not included in our study which could potentially 
influence the market response to bank loan announcements.   
 
Based on the literature, a favourable renewal bank loan announcement is believed to 
influence abnormal returns more than a new bank loan announcement. Lummer and 
McConnell (1989) suggested banks are able to gain an information advantage in the 
process of accessing private information after the new loan agreement, and could 
convey information to the market after the establishment of an ongoing relationship, 
which is reflected in the loan renewal.  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) reported that 
banks with greater reputation are able to convey more information than less reputable 
banks since reputable banks could provide borrowers with financial flexibility to 
renegotiate the loan in the event of financial distress.  
 
In terms of borrower reputation, Rajan (1992) identified the costs and benefits of 
having an ex-post lender such as banks are relatively small for high rating firms, and 
there is no difference between bank debt and public debt for these firms. In addition, 
based on the studies from Rajan and Winton (1995) and Mazumdar and Yan (1997), 
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firms with lower reputation benefit more from bank loans in the form of collateral and 
covenants. 
 
Due to the unavailability of data, these potential variables which could also influence 
the market response to bank loan announcements could not be tested and are not 
included in this research. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results demonstrate that the Hong Kong market response to bank 
loan announcements is positively significant, but insignificant for non-bank loan 
announcements. The results confirm the findings from previous studies (James,1987; 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; and Aintablian and Roberts, 2000), which suggested 
banks are “special” in financial markets based on the comparative advantages in 
screening and monitoring borrowers by accessing borrowers’ private information not 
available to other market participants. A bank could assess the financial background 
of the borrower and convey this information to the market by granting a loan to the 
individual. The information conveyed to the market is reflected by the market 
response to the bank loan announcement. The result suggests a bank could improve 
the information transmission and reduce the information asymmetry problem. 
 
Our results also indicate that the Hong Kong stock market is efficient in both strong 
form and semi-strong form for bank loan announcements. For non-bank loan 
announcements, there is strong evidence of an information leakage problem. In 
addition, market response to bank loan announcements could be partially explained by 
loan maturity, loan purpose, loan size, borrower’s firm size, borrower’s debt ratio, and 
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borrower’s industry type. The results demonstrate that the Hong Kong market 
response to bank loan announcements is positively related to loan syndication, short 
maturity loan, refinancing and capital expenditure purpose bank loan, no specific 
purpose bank loan, borrower’s debt ratio, borrowers with property industrial type and 
borrowers with property industry type. The market in bank loan announcements reacts 
negatively to borrowers’ firm size, loan maturity, and loan size. These results are 
generally consistent with existing literature (see James, 1987; Mikkelson and Partch, 
1986; Rajan, 1992; Slovin et al., 1992; Aintablian and Roberts, 2000; Boscaljon and 
Ho, 2005). Compared to previous studies conducted in the U.S, Canadian, and the 
U.K. market, the results show that findings under a different banking system and 
environment are robust for the Hong Kong market. 
 
5.4 Limitations 
There are certain limitations in this study. First, the only data source used in this 
research is the Hong Kong Exchange Database (HKEx Database). This limits the 
number of loan announcements obtained for our study. In addition, the requirement 
for announcement submission of soft copy is only mandatory for all listed companies 
after 15 February 2002 for HKEx Database, and this limits our research period, which 
is from May 1st 2002 to Dec 31st 2007. Based on the relatively short testing period, the 
number of renewal loan announcements obtained is quite small. This limits the test of 
Fama’s (1985) renewal hypothesis, which compared the market response between 
new bank loan announcement and renewal bank loan announcements. 
 
Small sample size is another limitation in our study. The initial number of loan 
announcements obtained is 606. However, further deletion to select “clean” loan 
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announcements results in 63 bank loan announcements and 17 non-bank loan 
announcements as the final research sample. The small sample size is consistent with 
the relatively smaller market capitalisation in the Hong Kong stock market compared 
to the U.S. market. The sample size could be increased by expanding the research 
period and using multiple data sources, however, both of these two solutions are 
limited in the Hong Kong Exchange Database. 
 
Another limitation is the lack of data for the pre-announcement period. Our results 
indicate there is a strong information leakage problem for non-bank loan 
announcements. Based on the studies from Wong et al. (2000) and Wong (2002), in 
order to test whether insiders could earn profits based on the information not publicly 
available during the pre-announcement period, data of stock trade price and stock 
trade volume are needed. Since the data for stock trade price and volume are not 
available, we could not test the strong-form of market efficiency for non-bank loan 
announcements.  
 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
Based on the limitations above, multiple data source and longer research period could 
be applied to improve the sample size and the number of loan announcement included 
for each testable category. In addition, future research could also test other possible 
explanatory variables not included in our study, such as loan type, borrower 
reputation, lender reputation, loan structure, whether borrower is in financial distress, 
and the covenants and collateral embedded in the loans. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
these variables can influence the market response to bank loan announcement. 
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Furthermore, both results of this study and previous research (Wong et al., 2000; 
Wong, 2002; and Cheuk et al., 2005) reveal an information leakage problem exists in 
the Hong Kong stock market. Further researches could generate a detailed test on the 
information leakage problem for non-bank loan announcements. One could also 
employ the strong form test of market efficiency for non-bank loan announcements by 
testing whether insiders could earn abnormal profits based on the information not 
publicly available. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Empirical Results of Studies on Stock price response (Abnormal Returns) to 
Bank Loan Announcements and Non-Bank Loan Announcements 
 
Studies Non-Bank Loan 
Announcements 
AR% (T-stat) (Sample Size)
Bank Loan 
Announcements 
AR% (T-stat) (Sample Size)
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
 
 0.89% (2.58)* (155) 
James (1987) 
 
 1.93% (3.96)** (80) 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) 
 
 0.61% (2.69)*** (728) 
Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock 
(1992) 
 1.31% (5.08)*** (273) 
Best and Zhang (1993) 
 
 0.32% (2.31)** (491) 
Preece and Mullineaux (1994) 1.84% (4.25)*** (36) 0.79% (3.77)*** (387) 
McDonald (1994) 
 
 0.64% (1.99)**   (250) 
Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel 
(1995) 
1.08% (1.58)NS  (41) 0.63% (3.63)*** (540) 
Thakor (1996) 
 
 0.02% (6.63)*** (161) 
James and Wier (1999) -0.90% (NR)NS (37)     2.00%  (NR)* (80) 
Aintablian and Roberts (2000)  1.22% (5.62)*** (122) 
Andre, Mathieu and Zhang 
(2001) 
 2.27% (2.68)*** (122) 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005)  1.63% (3.94)*** (44) 
Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers 
(2006) 
 0.46% (NR***) (1,111)
Kim Song Le (2007) 
 
 0.28% (2.58)** (2061) 
Bailey, Huang, and Yang (2008)  -0.39% (-2.34)** (285)
Ongena and Roscovan (2009)  0.53% (NR)*** (985) 
 
 
*  Significant at 10% level  
**  Significant at 5% level  
***  Significant at 1% level 
NR Not Reported  
NS Not Significant 
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T-Statistics for Average Standardized Abnormal Returns for Bank Loans
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Average Abnormal Returns for Non-Bank Loans 
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